In physics, causality has two faces. Traditionally, causality meant that states evolve according to a deterministic law. Recently, due to the influence of quantum information theory and statistical modeling, causality has also come to be understood as the power to influence the probability of an event by manipulating its causes. This raises some new questions: are causal relations properties of systems in themselves, or are they relative properties of a system and an observer (where an 'observer' may here be construed as another physical system)? Does causality play any role in restricting the amount by which quantum systems can violate classical inequalities? In this work, I argue that causal relations are observer-dependent. Leveraging a result of the Quantum Bayesian (QBist) program, I argue that the Born rule can be interpreted as a causal principle, which serves to define bounds on quantum correlations. An interesting side-effect of this approach is that the resulting causal model turns out to be symmetric under reversal of the direction of causality, suggesting that the orientation of cause and effect is a genuinely observer-dependent feature of causality that has no meaning in a system independently of its observation.
causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of these general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves, by any particular explication of them. These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry. [...] Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy, and meets us at every turn, in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it." -David Hume, 'An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding'
Humans have a powerful intuitive understanding of causality that precedes modern science. Historically, the role of causality was primarily sociological and not physical: it was a way of assigning blame. As such, it was closely tied to the idea of agency: the power (possessed only by Gods, people and animals) to make things happen and thereby be blamed for the consequences. After the Enlightenment, the role of causality changed and causal powers began to be attributed to inanimate objects. In the Epilogue of Causality [1] , Judea Pearl argues that this change was a direct result of technological progress. When a tree breaks or a stone shatters, we could continue to blame it on the Gods -but when a catapult or a wagon breaks it is much more informative (for the purposes of fixing it) to blame a frayed rope or a faulty wheel. Yet, this inclusion of inanimate matter into the class of things that can support causal relations introduces a new conception of causality quite different to its traditional sociological function: the idea of causality as representing a physical property, something that can be defined of physical systems independently of the human experience of agency.
The arrival of information theory and quantum mechanics in the 20th century has introduced a new facet to this problem. It has become apparent that there is a sense in which physical systems (i.e. not necessarily human or conscious) can be said to perform observations. An 'observation' in this broader sense means that one system acquires -and perhaps stores -information about another system. In quantum interference experiments, the visibility of interference fringes is found to degrade not just from human observation, but from the mere possibility of 'observation' by any sort of physical system. This leads to a new question regarding the physical status of causal relations, namely, whether these relations represent physical mechanisms intrinsic to the system (thus entirely independent of observation) or whether they represent a property of the system relative to an observing system, that is, can only be defined once certain physical properties of the 'observing system' are also defined.
The present work aims to contribute to understanding of this question by considering quantum systems specifically, and by restricting attention to a particular interpretation of causality that is currently favoured by scientists and engineers. This interpretation is based on the idea that causality tells us how the probability of an event would change if a special kind of manipulation called an intervention were be performed on it. This approach, whose formal aspects are dealt with in Refs. [1] [2] [3] , is variously known as 'manipulationist causality' (by philosophers), 'Bayesian networks' (by statisticians), or simply 'causal modeling', which is the term used in the present work.
These causal models are relevant to the main question of the present work because of numerous recent attempts to generalize these models to quantum mechanics. One thing that is striking about these various attempts is that they either fail to provide any guidance as to the nature of causal relations (whether intrinsic to the system or dependent on a physical observer) or else they emphasize the view that causal relations are entirely intrinsic to the system. The alternative possibility -that causal relations describe a relative property of system and observer -has been neither contradicted, nor explored in the literature to date. The present paper aims to fill that gap. I begin with the perspective from physics, and then reformulate the question more carefully with the help of some ideas selected from philosophy.
Although this paper is chiefly aimed at a rather select audience of people who are already familiar with work on quantum causal models, my approach to the topic of causal models is so different to what is normally found in textbooks that I have elected to make it as pedagogical as possible in some parts. This has the benefit of also making it partly accessible to a wider audience of newcomers to the topic, although such readers are likely to be frustrated at some parts of the paper where the discussion requires technical knowledge and familiarity with the literature. Moreover, experts might find some parts of this work overly pedantic or unnecessary. The following chapter outline may help the reader navigate the paper according to their taste.
The remainder of this introduction is divided into two parts: Sec. I A is a technical review of the literature likely to be more of interest to experts, while Sec. I B is less technical and focuses on philosophical aspects that newcomers may also find interesting. Chapter II covers the basics of classical causal models, which are for the most part accessible to newcomers, though the novel approach taken here may also interest those familiar with the topic. Newcomers may wish to skip the more technical parts of Sec. II C and Sec. II D. Chapter III is the main contribution of this work, concerned with how to construct a quantum causal model that meets the demands of a causal conventionalist. Most of this chapter should be reasonably accessible to a newcomer to the topic. Sec. III B, although technical, is recommended for all readers unfamiliar with Quantum Bayesianism, since it describes the key result that is leveraged in this paper by giving it a causal interpretation. Newcomers may wish to skip the technical parts in Sec. III D and Sec. III E. The first parts of Sec. III F may be of interest to a broad readership, but the sub-sections III F 2 and III F 3 are rather more technical. The discussion in Sec. IV does assume some knowledge of the literature, but may nevertheless be interesting to new readers.
A. Quantum Causality: the view from physics
We scientists have generally not troubled ourselves with the philosophical meaning of causality because it turns out that the most salient features of causality can be widely agreed upon without recourse to metaphysics. In particular, it is generally agreed (at least among physicists) that causation is transitive: if A causes B and B causes C, then A must cause C (in this case A is called an 'indirect' cause of C). Furthermore, it stands to reason that no cause can be its own effect, hence there can be no chain of causes leading from A back to itself. Based on these axioms, the causal relations among a set of propositions A, B, C, ... can be represented schematically by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) (see Fig.2 ). In this representation, a variable A is a cause of B iff there is at least one path leading from A to B following the directions of the arrows. It is also standard to use the additional terminology that A is a direct cause B if there is a single arrow from A to B, and an indirect cause if there is a path consisting of two or more arrows from A to B. These special cases do not exclude each other, thus A can be both a direct and indirect cause of B. Note that while cause is a transitive notion, the more refined notion of direct cause is not transitive.
FIG.
2. An example of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) representing causal relations among causal relata A, B, C. Here, the variable A is both a direct cause of C and an indirect cause of C via the variable B.
Beyond these basic axioms, there still remains a lot of flexibility in the physical meaning of causality. For example, some accounts of causality are necessarily deterministic, while others are probabilistic or counterfactual; an interesting overview of different metaphysical conceptions of causality can be found in Ref. [4] . Within the applies sciences that use causal notions to make predictions and diagnoses (such as the social and biomedical sciences, economics and artificial intelligence research), the dominant paradigm of causal modeling is the probabilistic, manipulationist account of causality as described in the textbooks of (among others) Pearl [1] and Spirtes, Glymour & Scheines [2] . These scientific models of causality are surprisingly different from the models commonly found in the philosophical literature. Two key features distinguish these causal models from other approaches. The first is that causal relations are supposed to hold between variables rather than particular events. The second is that causal models do not provide an exhaustive definition of causality (as philosophers tend to aim for): they simply tell us how certain causal propositions which are in doubt may be ascertained from other causal propositions that are presumed to be already known.
In causal models a direct cause from variable A to variable B is understood to mean that different 'manipulations' of the variable A change the conditional probability of B given A. Different approaches give somewhat different definitions of this relation, as well as different accounts of what constitutes a 'manipulation'. Another key feature of causal models is an assumption, called the 'Causal Markov Assumption (CMA)', which acts as the glue that binds probabilities to causal structure. The CMA states that the probabilities obtained from observing a physical system under appropriate conditions must satisfy certain statistical constraints depending on the causal structure of that system. In its simplest form, it states that there must be no correlations between variables unless they share some kind of causal connection or common cause. Once again, the justification of the CMA varies among different authors.
Causal models are especially well-suited to an operational treatment. Under this view, the statement 'A causes B' need not imply anything more than that an agent could send information to B by manipulating A, so that causal relations are abstracted away from their physical bases (whatever those might be) to become mere indicators of the possibility of signalling between the causal relata. The operational description is compatible with a wide range ofare built upon the presumption of 'agents' (the entities among whom information is sent and received) which seem to make the formalism fundamentally observer-dependent. It is therefore not clear that such approaches can shed light on the key questions of this work.
One notable exception to the above trend is the quantum causal model proposed by Allen et. al. [13] . Rather than treating RP1 as a purely empirical feature of classical physics, the authors relate it to a deeper physical conception of causality. It is well-known that RP1 can be derived by requiring that the observed probabilistic phenomena be compatible with the hypothesis of an underlying deterministic dynamics. That is to say, RP1 can be derived by assuming that probabilistic observations represent only a partial or incomplete state of knowledge about a dynamical system that in fact evolves continuously in time according to a deterministic law. Allen et. al. realized that this same principle, interpreted more generally, can be maintained in quantum mechanics. That is, they observed that the probabilistic phenomena of quantum systems can always be regarded as an incomplete or partial description of an underlying quantum dynamics that is unitary (hence deterministic). The authors realised that, as in the classical case, this assumption implies a quantitative factorization condition analogous to the classical RP1, the main difference being that it now applies to linear operators on Hilbert space instead of to probability distributions.
Remark: Allen et. al. were careful not to commit to saying that the 'underlying' dynamics of quantum systems must be unitary in reality -their result only requires that the observed phenomena be consistent with this hypothesis. In this regard, they appear to take an agnostic view about the nature of causality similar to the operationalists. The problem with taking such a pragmatic view is that the argument loses the main feature that sets it apart from operational approaches. If compatibility with an underlying determinism is merely an empirical fact (i.e. it is not mandated by a deeper physical principle) the fact that quantum systems appear to obey an analogous constraint is left as an unexplained coincidence. For this reason I prefer to interpret the proposal of Allen et. al. as grounding the RP1 in a causal principle, namely that physical systems in reality evolve continuously and deterministically in time. This then strongly points towards causality as a property of physical systems in themselves, i.e. a realist view of causality.
The quantum RP1 identified by Allen et. al. interprets the quantitative part of the RP1 as a factorization condition on abstract linear operators on Hilbert space, rather than directly as a condition on the probabilities. Hence it is not clear to what extent the quantum bounds on correlations arise as a consequence of Allen et. al.'s quantum version of RP1, and to what extent they simply arise from the assumption of Hilbert space structure. If the principle could be generalized beyond its Hilbert space representation, it could perhaps be ascertained whether or not it suffices to obtain the quantum bounds.
In this paper, I will investigate the alternative possibility that causal relations do not refer to processes within a system, but rather depend in some way on the context of observation, i.e. following the view of the causal conventionalist. According to this view, causal relations should be understood as relations between the probability distributions that are observed in counterfactual experiments. It will be found that the Born rule itself can be interpreted as such a rule, and can therefore provide the basis for a quantum causal model in the conventionalist spirit.
B. Causal models: a view from philosophy
Despite being in popular usage for decades by practitioners in the sciences and humanities, manipulationist causal models have only recently begun to be taken seriously by philosophers. The text Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation by James Woodward (Ref. [3] ) contains an illuminating account of manipulationist causal models based on a counterfactual interpretation. The model of quantum causality presented here owes much to Woodward's explication of classical causal models in terms of counterfactuals. However, I adopt a philosophical position not quite aligned with the one that Woodward endorses, preferring instead something closer to the account of causality promoted by Price [14] , which I believe sits more comfortably with the Quantum Bayesian viewpoint. The distinction between these two philosophical points of view is discussed below.
At the beginning of the Introduction, the question was posed whether causal relations are things that exist independently of observing systems or 'agents', or whether there is an observer-dependent component to causality. In the context of manipulationist accounts of causality, there are two main competing views: that of the causal realist, who sees causal relations as entirely present in the system, and the causal conventionalist, who sees cause and effect as a matter of convention, that is, as being defined only relative to a suitably defined observer. These distinct viewpoints are described below.
C1. Causal realist:
The fact that we observe cause and effect relationships between things is contingent on the existence of a causal mechanism that exists between these things in the external world independently of observers.
Consider, for instance, the following passage from Pearl [1] (emphasis in original): "[...] causal relationships are ontological, describing objective physical constraints in our world, whereas probabilistic relationships are epistemic, reflecting what we know or believe about the world".
According to the causal realist, causal relations refer to mechanisms or causal structures whose orientation and operation stand independently of any observer, human or otherwise (Note that such ontological mechanisms, if they exist, are time-asymmetric and hence represent a supplementary structure that is added to or superimposed upon the usual time-reversible laws of physics; see Price [14] ).
The causal conventionalist, on the other hand, does not consider causal structure as being entirely a feature of the system, but rather as a product of the interaction between an observer and the system. In particular, causality is a necessary feature of how the observer perceives or observes the system: C2. Causal conventionalist: Causal relations are not a feature of the external world, but rather a feature of how we, as agents or physical systems, acquire information about the world. That is, the existence of causal relations is not contingent on mechanisms that exist externally to us, but rather it is a necessary condition for 'observation' of an external system to be possible. Causal relations are therefore conventional insofar as they describe relations between the world and an observer.
How do these views compare in light of the present aim of constructing a manipulationist model of causality that can account for quantum systems? The causal realist locates causality in physical processes. When these processes are stochastic maps (i.e. transformations of probabilities), as they are in the classical case, then the restrictions placed by causal structure on probabilities (i.e. via the Causal Markov Assumption) naturally lead to bounds on the strength of correlations in the form of inequality constraints. However, when the causal processes in question are represented by abstract mathematical entities that have no direct probabilistic meaning, such as operators on Hilbert space, then the causal structure of these entities no longer plays a direct role in mediating the strength of correlations (i.e. the amount by which the classical inequalities can be violated). Indeed, in the operational approaches and the work of Allen et. al., the Born rule (from which bounds on probabilities are computed) is simply a postulated mapping from states to probabilities, in which form it seems to have little to do with causality. This is exemplified by the fact that, based on these models, one can conceivably construct theories in which causality is violated but the Born rule still holds, or conversely in which causality is upheld but the Born rule is violated. An example of the first kind of theory is the process martix formalism, which can describe theories that are locally quantum but violate causal inequalities and thus cannot be consistently embedded in any causal space-time [15] . Examples of the second kind of theory are generalized probabilistic models beyond quantum mechanics [6, 16] .
On the other hand, the conventionalist view C2 interprets the statement 'A causes B' as expressing what would happen to B (as seen by an observer) if an appropriate manipulation by that observer were to be performed on A. Even without going into depth as to what these phrases mean ('observer','seen by an observer','manipulation by an observer'), causal relations understood in this way can quite naturally be expressed as relations between counterfactual probability distributions. In fact, as discussed in Sec. III A of this paper, the Born rule can be directly interpreted as a rule that describes how probabilities would change if certain disturbing measurements were to be performed: that is, the Born rule can be understood as a type of causal law in the conventionalist sense. Based on this, it is then plausible that the correct bounds on quantum correlations would follow from such a 'causal law'. I am therefore led to take C2 as the philosophical starting point for a model of quantum causality.
It is important to note that although the conventionalist approach seems to lead one naturally to the idea of a manipulationist causal model, the converse does not hold: it is possible to take a manipulationist view of causality without being a conventionalist about causality. As an example, the counterfactual manipulatonist theory of Woodward [3] appears to be consistent with the causal realist position (C1). In his own words: "[...] if it is possible to change Y by intervening on X, then there must be an independently existing, invariant relationship between X and Y that the agent makes use of when she changes X and, in doing so, changes Y -a relationship that would exist and have whatever characteristics it has even if the agent were unable to manipulate X or chose not to manipulate X or did not exist" [3] .
Woodward even goes so far as to argue that the conventionalist view is untenable for any plausible manipulationist account of causality. The main thrust of Woodward's argument is that there seems to be something undeniably objective about causal statements (modulo certain background assumptions). Woodward gives the example of stepping in front of a speeding bus: the question of whether this would cause him to be injured hardly seems to be a matter of convention or subjective beliefs, but has rather more the character of a brute fact. The conventionalist's response to Woodward's arguments can be found in Refs. [14, 17] . It rests on making a careful distinction between two distinct notions of objectivity. One notion is that a causal relation is objective if it holds true absolutely. The other notion is that a causal relation is objective if it holds true for a large class of observers that includes humans. The latter notion of objectivity might be called relative objectivity. Unlike the causal realist, who insists that causal relations are absolutely objective, the conventionalist only concedes objectivity in the relative sense. Note, however, that this is still a very strong notion of objectivity. Price likens the objectivity of a causal relation to the objectivity of the sourness of lemons: "Once we understand the rudiments of the biological basis of our sense of taste, it is easy to see that we might well have been constructed so that we found lemons sweet instead of sour. Moreover, it seems plausible to say that given differently equipped communities of this kind, there isn't an objective sense in which one is right and the other wrong. [...] From the external perspective it only makes sense to say that lemons taste sweet to group A and sour to group B. [14] " On one hand, it is clear that the sourness of a lemon is not an intrinsic property of the lemon, but rather a property of how we humans interact with the lemon with our taste-buds. On the other hand, the lemon seems pretty objectively sour: try as we might, we cannot make a lemon taste sweet by the force of our will. Could it be the same with causal relations?
In the case of Woodward and the speeding bus, a conventionalist might be willing to grant the absolute objectivity of the correlation between Woodward's initial position X (sidewalk or road) and his final state Y (healthy or injured). This correlation is merely indicative of a possible causal relation, but it tells us nothing of the direction of causality.
The meaning of the statement that X causes Y is, on a manipulationist account, that the correlation is maintained when X is manipulated but disappears when Y is manipulated. The question, therefore, is whether this asymmetry is entirely a dormant property of the system that is simply revealed by the manipulation (view C1), or whether it is introduced somehow through the physical act of 'manipulation' by an observer (view C2). On further reflection, the asymmetry can be traced to the fact that, in our experience, our future actions cannot affect what has already happened in our past. This fact is not built-in to the apparatus of the fundamental laws of physics: the orientation of the time-axis is something that we put in by hand, choosing it to match with the direction of time that we experience, that is, with our own thermodynamic time.
Yet nothing in the laws of physics would exclude considering a hypothetical pocket of the universe whose thermodynamic time runs contrary to ours. Intelligent beings in that pocket would label the time axis opposite to our own labeling. Perhaps among them would be a philosopher, let us call him Anti-Woodward, who would consider stepping in front of a speeding bus so as to prove that it causes his injury. From our point of view, however, the event of Anti-Woodward's being injured or not precedes the event of his stepping (or not) in front of the bus. We would therefore be tempted to conclude that we could in principle make Woodward step or not step in front of the bus by fixing the initial conditions so as to have him either injured or not injured; the laws of physics would bring about the former from the latter. The conventionalist therefore suggests that at least the direction of a causal influence is a property that depends both on system and observer, and that a system in isolation need not have any intrinsic temporal directionality associated with it, as the causal realist would wish.
Beyond the direction of causality, it is also a conventional matter whether or not a particular causal claim can be established at all. Even a causal realist must acknowledge (as Woodward does) that some amount of observerdependence is inevitable in asserting causal relations, because it must first be decided which counterfactual possibilities are to be seriously considered. For example, the possibility of a gas leak in an apartment is a legitimate possible cause of a fire, whereas the presence of oxygen in the room at the time is not considered a contributing cause, because the possibility of its not being present is not seriously considered (note that this is due to a circumstantial physical limitation only: if the air in the apartment could plausibly be drained at the push of a button, it would become a contributing cause). It is only after having agreed on all relevant background details including such matters of what is "seriously possible", which together I refer to as the experimental context, that the conventionalist would concede along with Woodward that causal statements such as 'the gas leak caused the fire' are about as objective as one could hope for.
Yet, this fact that causality cannot be defined independently of the experimental context greatly favours the view of the conventionalist over that of the realist. Consider a 'natural' experiment (to extricate ourselves from any appeal to human agency or free will) in which a falling rock happens to land on top of a water spout A, stopping the flow of water that was running to a pond B, which subsequently dries up. Following Woodward, we may take this experiment as revealing the fact that A causes B, via what could reasonably be called the 'manipulation of A by the falling rock'. For this conclusion to be coherent, however, we must imagine that there are at least two possible states for each variable, for instance that the rock could fall or not fall, the spout could flow or not flow, and the pond dry up or remain full. Unless we suppose that these variables are thus changeable, we cannot (as manipulationists) make any sense of the assertion that causal relations hold between them. But on what basis can we assert that variables are changeable? What if it is pre-determined that the rock should fall, the spring be blocked and the pond dry up? It is precisely this aspect of causality that needs to be assumed a priori in order for us to make sense of the world: that interventions can be performed and variables can have their values changed.
This assumption entails dependence on an observer, for who is to be the authority that decides which variables are changeable and which are not? Unless we appeal to some kind of magical powers of human agents to bring about change (a move that it is safe to assume Woodward would not endorse) we must admit that this assumption is made as a matter of convention, as it depends on identifying the "serious possibilities" that are available to the class of observers in question. These are none other than the possible actions that the observers can physically perform upon the system, and so depends on how these observers are situated relative to the system. On one hand, observers who happen to agree on the same context by virtue of being physically situated in the same relation to the system, i.e. who agree on which variables are effectively changeable and what possibilities are practically allowed for them, can take causal facts to be 'objective' for all practical purposes. On the other hand, this apparent objectivity of a causal relation does not indicate its existence in an observer-independent reality, contrary to the insistence of the causal realist.
All of this might seem to some readers frustratingly vague, and indeed it is. How are we to identify physical observers belonging to the same 'class' with respect to causal relations? What are the physical properties that distinguish observer-classes, and what are the processes by which observers observe systems and collaborate to form an agreed-upon model of the causal relations in the system? Such questions are beyond the scope of this work. To make progress on these matters, it is necessary to understand how a group of observers 'constitutes' a causal relation. Along these lines, philosophical work rethinking causality in light of quantum complementarity can be found in Refs. [18] [19] [20] [21] ).
II. CAUSATION IN CLASSICAL MODELS
In this section, I will review classical causal models, taking a conventionalist view. My approach differs from standard presentations in that it emphasizes more the role of counterfactuals. In particular, I introduce special notation to designate whether a measurement is performed or not. This distinction is rarely found in the literature, because for classical causal models the counterfactual case in which a measurement is not performed is trivially the same as marginalization over the outcome and so does not require special treatment, whereas in the quantum case the difference between ignoring a measurement and not performing it becomes critical.
Before embarking, it is important to define some concepts that will be useful throughout this work. The very first of these is the definition of what it means to say that 'A causes B' in counterfactual terms:
Counterfactual Causation: Let A, B be random variables with an observed distribution P (A, B). Then the statement 'A causes B' means that the conditional probability of B would change if a special kind of operation called a "manipulation" were to be performed on A (and leaving other variables alone). Formally, this condition can be expressed as:
In other words: the probability of B conditioned on the value of A depends also on whether or not A was manipulated. In general, there are many types of physical operation that might qualify as a 'manipulation of A' for the purposes of defining causality. Standard texts usually focus on an idealized type of manipulation called an intervention, which will be defined in Sec. II B 2. At present, it is sufficient to note that any manipulation replaces the marginal distribution P (A) with a new distribution P (A), and it replaces the conditional distribution P (B|A) with a manipulated conditional P (B|A, manipulate A), resulting in the new manipulated joint distribution P (A, B) := P (B|A, manipulate A) P (A). This makes it apparent that the above definition of causality is essentially a comparison between two distinct situations: the one in which the joint distribution is P (A, B) and A is not manipulated, compared to the one in which the joint distribution is P (A, B) and A is manipulated. Throughout this work, probability distributions over variables that sustain causal relationships, such as the distributions P (A, B) and P (A, B), will be referred to as behaviours. In Sec. II B the variables will be interpreted as the outcomes of measurements performed upon a physical system in the course of an experiment, and so it will be natural to talk about the 'behaviour of a system in an experiment', as referring to the probability distribution of measurement outcomes obtained over the whole experiment. Thus, we can think of causality as a relation between two distinct behaviours of a system that are elicited in two distinct experiments: in one experiment some variables are manipulated, and in the other, these variables are left alone.
It is not at all obvious that the behaviour under manipulation P (A, B) can be determined from the behaviour P (A, B) plus the sparse information that 'A causes B'. Remarkably, this is precisely what causal modeling allows us to do: given the behaviour of a system in one experiment, plus a specification of all the causal relations between its variables, the model allows us to infer exactly how the system would behave if some other experiment were to be performed instead. This relationship is generally asymmetric: just because the data from experiment 1 together with causal relations allows us to make inferences about the behaviour in experiment 2 does not mean that the reverse is possible. It is therefore natural to ask what characterizes those experiments which are most useful for the purposes of causal modeling, in the sense that if we know the causal relations that hold among the variables in such an experiment, then they can be used to deduce how the system would behave in the largest possible set of alternative experiments.
One possible characterization common in the statistical literature is to distinguish between experiments that involve purely passive observation of some system, called an observational scheme, versus experiments that actively manipulate the system, called an interventionist scheme or just simply a 'randomized controlled experiment'. This distinction comes very naturally to the applied scientists who are accustomed to first observing their target 'in the wild' (i.e. under uncontrolled natural conditions), formulating hypotheses based on this observational scheme, and then bringing individuals into to the lab to test the hypothesis under controlled conditions. In such cases, causal graphs are first proposed to explain the data from the observational scheme, from which the causal model can be used to predict the system's behaviour under any number of possible interventions. Generally it is not possible to do the converse, that is to anticipate the behaviour of the system in the observational scheme from its behaviour in just a single interventionist scheme. A full reconstruction of the non-intervened behaviour requires data from multiple distinct interventions. One is therefore led to conclude that some experimental settings are better than others at producing behaviour that is useful for causal inference; such experiments will be called maximally counterfactually informative.
As an example, consider a source that produces single particles always in the same state S. An experiment might consist of performing a single measurement X on the system, where the property to be measured is determined by the roll of a die with outcomes x ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, and where the outcome is represented by a variable Y . After many trials, one obtains the behaviour P (X, Y ). This experiment qualifies as maximally counterfactually informative if one can in principle uniquely reconstruct the state S from the data P (X, Y ), that is, if the set of measurements that defines the experiment is tomographically complete for the system. Note, however, that the 'state' S is just a compact way of representing our expectations of how the particle will act under a variety of different experimental conditions. Thus, if one unpacks the concept of a 'state' into its constituent probabilities, the above example merely re-asserts (as per the definition) that the experiment qualifies as maximally counterfactually informative if the data P (X, Y ) can be used to make inferences about how the system would behave in any possible alternative experiment. We can therefore identify the class of maximally counterfactually informative experiments with those that produce tomographically complete data for the system over repeated trials.
For the purposes of causal modeling, it is useful to select just one maximally counterfactually informative experiment to serve as the starting point from which causal inferences are to be made. This experiment, chosen by convention, will be referred to as the reference experiment and the system's behaviour in this experiment will be called its reference behaviour. Beyond the minimal requirement of being maximally counterfactually informative, the choice of reference experiment is purely conventional.
In the classical setting, the reference experiment for a causal model will tend to be an observational scheme. However, for quantum systems, the distinction between an observational scheme and an interventionist scheme is difficult to maintain, because of the fact that measurements on a quantum system invariably disturb the quantum state. This issue and its implications will be a recurring theme throughout this work; for the present it is enough to note that the relevant distinction in quantum causal models is not between passive observation and active manipulation as such, but rather between experiments that are maximally counterfactually informative and those that are not. The task of such a model is then to show how the behaviour in the latter type of experiments can be deduced from the behaviour in the former type, specifically from a reference behaviour supplemented with a causal graph. The concept of a passive observation plays no central role in this procedure (although, as will be discussed in Sec. IV D, there is still a weak sense in which quantum measurements can qualify as 'passive').
A final remark is needed regarding the factual/counterfactual distinction as it is used here. In any manipulationist account of causality, one makes an explicit distinction between two different types of counterfactuals: those that represent alternative possible events within a given experiment, and those that represent variations between different experiments. In cases where it is necessary to distinguish them, the former will be called intracontextual counterfactuals and the latter will be called extracontextual. Obviously there is a certain amount of ambiguity in deciding whether two counterfactual events represent intracontextual or extracontextual alternatives; nevertheless, this line must be drawn in order for causal analysis to be meaningful. At the level of formalism, a behaviour such as P (A, B) for different values of A, B represents a set of intracontextual counterfactuals within the corresponding experiment; the extracontextual alternatives are distinguished according to which variables are (or are not) manipulated and which measurements are (or are not) performed. For example, let A, B be the body temperature in Celsius and blood pressure in units mmHg of a sick patient. Then the set of probabilities {P (A = 37
• , B = 135mmHg), P (A = 38
• , B = 140mmHg)} represents one set of intracontextual counterfactuals, within the context of 'no manipulation', and {P (A = 38
• |manipulate B = 145mmHg), P (A = 36
• |manipulate B = 80mmHg)} represents a different set of intracontextual counterfactuals, within the context of 'force the patient's blood pressure to different values and see what happens to their temperature'. The pair {P (A = 37
• , B = 135mmHg), P (A = 36
• |manipulate B = 80mmHg)} would then be a set of extracontextual counterfactuals, because they refer to different contexts.
In this work, the descriptors 'factual' and 'counterfactual' are generally reserved for counterfactuals of the extracontextual kind. The decision of how to apply the labels factual or counterfactual to a given experiment or behaviour ultimately rests on what one wishes to know. Causal models only provide us with relationships between different probability distributions, but it is up to us to specify which probabilities are known a priori and which ones we aim to deduce from these. In cases where such a distinction is called for in this work, it will generically be assumed that the reference behaviour is known (i.e. is 'factual') and that all other behaviours are unknown counterfactuals that are to be deduced. However, the reader should keep in mind that what is considered known and unknown a priori is essentially conventional.
A. Notation
In the statistical literature, P (X) represents a normalized function on the domain defined by the discrete set of values of X. A specific value of X is typically represented by a lowercase x, so that P (X = x) is not a function but merely a real number representing the probability that X takes the specific value x. In the present work, I use a 'lazy' notation in which P (X) is always used, and whether it represents a distribution or a set of values of a distribution must be deduced from the context. With practice, this can be done relatively easily. As a rule of thumb, any equation containing terms like P (X) such as
should be interpreted as a set of equations of the form:
with each equation in the set corresponding to a distinct pair of values x, z and where the summation is over all the distinct values of y. When not appearing in equations, terms like P (X) should be regarded as distributions, not numbers. Finally, the following notational conventions are used: capital roman letters represent single random variables X, Y, A, B, ...; bold capital roman letters represent sets of variables, eg. X = A ∪ B; the set union is often omitted or replaced by a comma where it is obvious from the context, eg. P (A, B) = P (A ∪ B).
B. Canonical measurements
Arguably the most important contribution of causal models to our understanding of causality is their answer to the following question: what are the relata that causal relations are supposed to relate? This is an essential component of causal models, for it tells us how to physically interpret the nodes in a causal graph. The prototype for causal analysis is that the relata are a set of N random variables, X = X 1 ∪ X 2 ∪ ...X N , representing measurements in distinct space-time regions whose values are the possible measurement outcomes. This inspires the following abstract definition:
Canonical measurements: The canonical measurements are those measurements that are capable of supporting causal relations among themselves.
In this definition, "capable of supporting causal relations" is understood to mean "sufficiently informative to support inferences about counterfactuals". Below, we will elaborate on what properties the measurements should have in order to meet this requirement.
Remark: Throughout this work the term "measurement" is used rather loosely to mean any localized physical action on a system that produces an outcome. Perhaps counter-intuitively, this includes variables whose values are completely determined according to the will of the scientist; after all, the action of turning a dial to some chosen value is a 'localized physical action on a system that produces an outcome'.
The measurements are assumed to be performed on some external arrangement of physical objects evolving in time and interacting with one another in between; this collection of objects is referred to simply as the system. After observing the system repeatedly using the same set of measurements (each of which is assumed to occupy a distinct localized region of space-time), a distribution P (X) is obtained over the possible values of its variables X. Assuming the measurements are canonical, this distribution is taken to represent the reference behaviour of the system.
Given the knowledge of the reference behaviour P (X), one wishes to infer what the system's behaviour would be under different circumstances. Attention is restricted to counterfactual experiments involving some combination of the following two operations: (1) performing additional canonical measurements Y, and (2) not performing some subset Z of the canonical measurements X. Within the scope of these possibilities, the following assumptions are intuitively appealing:
Properties of canonical measurements: (i) The local properties of a measurement should be necessary and sufficient to determine if it is canonical. Therefore whether or not a measurement is canonical cannot depend on what happens outside of the local space-time region in which the measurement occurs: if X is a canonical measurement, then it remains a canonical measurement even after additional measurements Y are performed and Z are not performed.
(ii) The behaviour P (X) for canonical measurements X contains enough information to deduce how the system would behave if Y were performed, and if Z were not performed. (iii) A canonical measurement should provide the maximum possible information about the measured subsystem. More rigorously: if a measurement X is equivalent to performing a different measurement X and then discarding some information about the outcome of X , then X does not qualify as canonical.
It is fortunate that Nature has furnished us with physical measurements that satisfy the above properties, since they are what makes causal inference possible. There are two main classes of canonical measurements that deserve special attention: the 'non-disturbing measurements' and the 'interventions'. These are discussed in the following sections.
Non-disturbing measurements
What is a non-disturbing measurement? The causal realist would say that a measurement is non-disturbing if it does not change the system's objective state (whose definition is left as a puzzle for the realists). For a conventionalist, this question is much easier to answer: whether or not the system was 'disturbed' reduces to the operational question of whether the performance or non-performance of a measurement can be detected by examining the other variables. This leads to the following definition:
Non-disturbing measurements: Let P (X) be the reference behaviour of a system and P (X, Y) the new behaviour under measurements Y. Then the measurements Y are called non-disturbing relative to X if and only if their inclusion does not change the behaviour of the measurements X.
Note that this definition is subjective in the sense that it is only meaningful relative to some variables of interest X. For conceptual clarity, it will be useful to introduce the notation P (X|Y + ) (resp. P (X|Y − )) to indicate the probabilities P (X) conditional that the measurements Y were (resp. were not) performed. Using this notation, we can give a purely mathematical definition of non-disturbance:
Non-disturbing measurements (refined):
The measurements Y are called non-disturbing iff:
In a Classical Causal Model, all variables that are not exogenous (i.e. all variables that have causes) represent non-disturbing measurements. Non-disturbing measurements are so ubiquitous in classical models that one rarely finds them explicitly identified as such. This can easily lead the unwary reader to conflate the concept of a canonical measurement (i.e. one that supports causal relations) with the much stronger concept of a non-disturbing measurement. Care must be taken to keep these concepts separate, as later it will transpire that the canonical measurements in quantum mechanics are typically disturbing.
Interventions
The fundamental axiom of manipulationist models, as captured by Eqn. (1), is that a causal relation tells us what would happen if a variable were to be manipulated. Any reasonable understanding of 'manipulated' suggests some kind of interference or disturbance of the system. An intervention is a particular kind of disturbing measurement whose properties make it ideal for inferring causal relations. If every variable in a system can be independently controlled by an intervention, then perfect knowledge of the causal relationships between the variables is possible. In this sense, causal relations can be thought of as expressing our counterfactual expectations of how a system would behave under hypothetical interventions on any of its variables.
An intervention can usefully be thought of as an idealization of the familiar technique of introducing a randomized control in an experiment. Physically, it means forcing a variable to take a particular value in a manner that is independent of its usual causes within the system of interest. One example is actively controlling the temperature of a system instead of passively measuring its temperature under ambient conditions. Another is assigning patients randomly to the treatment or control groups in a drug trial, instead of allowing them to choose whether to take the treatment themselves.
The notation Y do is used to indicate that the variables Y are introduced as interventions on certain variables within X . Hence Y do can be thought of as a special case of Y + ; the latter notation will continue to be used only where we wish to remain non-specific about the precise nature of the performed measurements Y. As an example, suppose that interventions Y are introduced on a set of variables W ∈ X, and let R be the remaining non-intervened variables in X. Then P (RW|Y do ) represents the probability distribution over the values of R and W, conditional on the fact that Y represent interventions on W. (Note that in the literature one more commonly finds the notation
To define an intervention, we need to supplement P (X) with information about the causal relations in the system. For a system of variables X, the causal relations between them are specified by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) denoted G(X), having the variables X as nodes. The direct causes of any variable X i in G(X) are called its parents, denoted pa(X i ), and family-tree terminology (children, ancestors, descendants) will often be used in the text to describe the graphical relations of variables in a DAG. The terminology 'A causes B' will also be used where B is descended from A. The system's behaviour and its causal graph together define a causal model :
Classical Causal Model:
A Classical Causal Model consists of a reference behaviour P (X) and a causal graph G(X) that is consistent with P (X) (the meaning of 'consistent' will be postponed to Sec. II C).
Given a system with reference behaviour P (X) and corresponding DAG, a causal model provides a recipe for computing the new behaviour P (X|Y do ) that would occur if we were to perform interventions Y. For instance, in the case of the drug trial, if a patient is allowed to choose whether to take the drug or not (variable W ∈ X), their decision may depend on many factors Z that are also relevant to their recovery. To break the causal dependence of W on Z, the scientist randomly chooses (variable Y ) whether or not to treat each patient. Under the idealized assumption that the patient takes the medication when it is prescribed (and not otherwise), then the intervention variable Y perfectly determines the treatment variable W and breaks the causal effect of Z on X. The following properties serve to define interventions:
Properties of interventions:
Let {P (X), G(X)} be a causal model. A measurement Y introduced into this model is called an intervention on some variable W ∈ X iff the resulting model, denoted {P (X, Y |Y do ), G(X, Y |Y do )}, satisfies the following properties: (i) Y is a direct cause of W and only W in G(X, Y |Y do ); (ii) Whether or not the intervention Y is performed does not affect the probabilities of variables of which W is not a cause. Formally, let A, R denote the ancestors and other non-descendants of W . Then:
(iii) The performance of Y does not affect the marginal probabilities of descendants of W except through its effect on the values of their parents. Formally, if D denotes the descendants of W , then:
(iv) The value of W is equal to the value of Y , hence W has no other causes in G(X, Y ); (v) Y has no parents in the system, i.e. it is exogenous in G(X, Y |Y do ).
The intuitive explanations for these properties are as follows. (i),(ii),(iii) all serve to ensure that the effect of the intervention is localized on W , and does not affect any other variables except through the mediation of its effect on W . (ii) can be interpreted as a consequence of the operational principle of no-signalling, since if it were violated, an agent situated at the event of W could send information to variables outside of the causal future of W simply by choosing to perform or not perform Y (this will be discussed in more depth in Sec. III F). Property (iii) ensures that Y can only affect the causal future of W through the value of W itself. This could be violated if, in the example of the drug trial, there is a placebo effect such that a patient who knows they are being treated will be more likely to recover, even when the treatment itself is ineffective. The standard way to enforce (iii) against placebo effects is to ensure that the patient does not know whether they are in the treatment or the control group, i.e. they do not know the value of Y , and hence Y cannot affect their recovery by a purely psychological route that bypasses the actual treatment W . More abstractly, a good experimental design should not 'leak' information to other variables about whether or not Y was performed. Condition (iv) amounts to the ideal assumption that the patient always takes the medicine that the doctor prescribes, hence rendering obsolete any other factors that might otherwise have affected the patient's decision to take the medicine. Finally, (iv) ensures that the decision Y is effectively randomized relative to all variables of interest X; it could be violated if, for instance, the treatment is more likely to be administered to patients that appear more sick.
The new DAG G(X, Y |Y do ) following the intervention of Y on W is defined as the DAG obtained from G(X) by introducing a new node Y , adding a single arrow from Y to W , and then deleting all other incoming arrows to W (Fig. 3 ).
FIG. 3. A causal graph before and after an intervention.
The above definition generalizes straightforwardly to multiple interventions on multiple variables, where it is assumed that an independent intervention is performed on each distinct variable that is to be controlled.
A word about exogenous variables
In a causal model, variables without causes (exogenous variables) play a special role: they represent certain background conditions that exist prior to the experiment and that partly serve to define the experiment. They include, for instance, the initial state of all the systems of interest, as well as the initial state of any relevant environmental factors such as the temperature or noise-level in the laboratory. It would not make sense to 'un-perform' an exogenous measurement, since the very notion of the system would be lost, and so the definition of non-disturbing measurements does not apply to them. Consider, for example, a quantum optics experiment with photons. In order for the experiment to be possible, a large box is placed over the optical table to shield it from external light. The box is associated with an exogenous variable B that represents the small amount of light that nevertheless leaks through the cracks in the box. If one then tries to imagine how the photons would behave without the box in place, one finds that it is impossible, since no photons would be resolved against the glaring daylight. For practical purposes, exogenous variables can always be treated as variables that have been intervened upon so as to imitate the ambient conditions that actually obtain at the beginning of the experiment.
C. The Causal Markov Assumption
In the previous section, a Classical Causal Model was defined as a reference behaviour P (X) of the system together with a causal graph G(X) that is consistent with that behaviour. Consistency means just that the behaviour respects certain intuitions about how causal relations affect correlations. The simplest of these intuitions is that variables should only be correlated if they have some kind of causal connection (eg. one causes the other or there is a common cause). These intuitions are based on our experience with physical systems. In particular, in cases where the causal mechanisms are well-known (such as in systems where all variables can be isolated from each other and separately manipulated) it has been observed that the causal relations imply certain facts about the probability distributions, and one of these is that causation tends to imply correlation. The rules that link causal structure to probabilities are thus ultimately empirical, and they hold true only insofar as they can be made to hold true in experiments. On the other hand, if certain of these rules turn out to be robust for a variety of physical systems across a wide range of physical regimes, they may be taken as indicating something true about the underlying reality. It is therefore essential to examine exactly what these rules are that link causal relations to probabilities.
In a Classical Causal Model, the precise conditions that determine whether G(X) is consistent with the probabilities P (X) are given by the Markov Condition (a mathematical property of the model) together with the Causal Markov Assumption, which asserts that this property actually holds true for natural systems in principle. These are discussed below.
MC. The Markov Condition:
A reference behaviour P (X) is said to satisfy the Markov Condition relative to a DAG G(X) iff P (X) factorizes according to:
where pa(X i ) are the parents of X i in G(X).
CMA. The Causal Markov Assumption:
The reference behaviour P (X) of the observed variables X of a physical system in a suitably designed experiment can always be expressed as:
such that P (X, L) satisfies the Markov Condition relative to some DAG G(X, L), where the unobserved variables L are called latent variables.
The intuition behind the CMA is as follows: complex physical systems generally contain a large number of variables that are relevant to their causal behaviour (i.e. their response to interventions), of which only a subset are typically accessible to direct measurement. Therefore it would be asking too much to demand that our observations of such systems -even under the most ideal conditions -should conform to the Markov Condition relative to some causal structure. Instead, one makes the weaker assumption that the Markov Condition only holds for the presumed-to-exist latent causal system that includes latent variables, i.e. the system that is believed to be generating the observed behaviour.
Given an observed behaviour, the CMA provides a useful tool to rule out certain hypotheses G(X, L) about the latent causal structure. However, without making further assumptions, it is fairly weak. Consider, for example, that the CMA alone can never be used to rule out causal graphs that are complete (i.e. where every node has a direct causal connection to every other node). Such graphs are generally fine-tuned, which means that they posit direct causal connections between some variables that are conditionally statistically independent in the behaviour. To eliminate such fine-tuned hypotheses, it is common to assume no-fine-tuning, which states that there should be no statistical independences in the behaviour beyond those that are required by the CMA for the proposed DAG. This considerably reduces the number of candidate causal graphs that are consistent with a given behaviour, which greatly assists causal inference.
The assumption of no-fine-tuning can be justified on various grounds that we will not review here. Pragmatically, the important point is that in most cases fine-tuning does not eliminate those hypotheses that seem most natural or plausible, hence it is seen as a relatively harmless way to eliminate 'spurious' hypotheses. A conflict might arise, however, in cases where the most intuitive or plausible explanation for a phenomenon is rejected by no-fine-tuning, or in cases where (as in quantum mechanics) it is impossible to find any DAG that satisfies both CMA and is not fine-tuned (see Sec. III A). In such cases, the validity of both the CMA and the no-fine-tuning assumption must be critically examined.
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed throughout this work that all relevant variables are observed, hence that there are no latent variables L. In this case, the CMA reduces to requiring that P (X) satisfy the Markov Condition MC relative to a DAG G(X). However, one must acknowledge that in practice most causal inference is performed in cases where latent variables are either known or inferred to exist.
It is therefore a basic assumption of Classical Causal Models that a system observed in an ideal experiment will exhibit behaviour that satisfies MC for some DAG.
There is a certain amount of circularity in this assumption, because to a large extent the assumption itself is used to define what is meant by an 'ideal experiment', namely, one that is designed such that the MC can be satisfied! Upon more careful examination, this circularity is found to be benign. An 'ideal experiment' means that care has been taken to eliminate any features of the experimental design that are known to confound the Markov Condition for well-understood reasons. Some key guidelines are: distinct variables should refer to logically distinct properties (eg. 'number of ravens' R and 'number of birds' B are not logically distinct); variables should be sufficiently fine-grained into elementary properties (eg. 'amount of food' should be decomposed into several variables for specific food types, or specific nutrients, depending on the aim of the experiment); the system of variables should be 'causally sufficient' (i.e. must include all common causes of all pairs of variables of interest); and if the system is prepared using post-selection, care must be taken to ensure that this does not introduce spurious correlations. This is not an exhaustive list -more details can be found in standard texts [1] [2] [3] .
It can be seen that the above criteria for an ideal experiment provide necessary conditions for the MC to be able to hold. Beyond that, however, they do not by themselves guarantee that a system will satisfy the MC in an ideal experiment, and it is in this sense that this assumption (and more generally the CMA) is not entirely circular in its appeal to the notion of an ideal experiment.
To understand the physical intuition behind the MC, it is instructive to examine its consequences in three special cases, Each of which represents a situation that commonly arises in practice. For each case, the MC reduces to a simple rule; it is useful to treat each of these rules as an independent principle in its own right. The three principles resulting from the MC and their associated special cases are listed below:
RP1. Reichenbach's Principle of Common Causes (quantitative version):
Suppose neither of X 1 , X 2 is a cause of the other and C is the complete set of their shared ancestors (i.e. C contains all 'common causes'), then P (X 1 X 2 |C) = P (X 1 |C)P (X 2 |C) (see Fig. 4(a) ).
SSO. Sequential screening-off:
Suppose X 1 causes X 2 and they have no shared ancestors, and suppose every path connecting X 1 to X 2 is intercepted by a variable in D (i.e. contains a chain → D →); then P (X 1 X 2 |D) = P (X 1 |D)P (X 2 |D) (see Fig. 4(b) ).
BK. Berkson's rule:
Suppose neither of X 1 , X 2 is a cause of the other and they have no shared ancestors, and suppose B is a common descendant of X 1 , X 2 ; then one generally expects them to be correlated conditional on B, i.e. that P (X 1 X 2 |B) = P (X 1 |B)P (X 2 |B) (see Fig. 4(c) ). Remark: The principle BK is different to the other two principles: whereas RP1 and SSO state conditions under which conditional independence is mandatory, BK provides conditions under which "one expects" conditional correlations. The principle derives from a well-known result in statistics called 'Berkson's Paradox', after the medical statistician Joseph Berkson [22] . Although not really a paradox, it is so named because newcomers to statistics often find it counter-intuitive. It is important to note that as it is defined here, BK does not altogether exclude the possibility that X 1 , X 2 are independent conditional on B, in much the same way that a direct arrow from X 1 to X 2 does not exclude the possibility of their independence; the point is rather that there is no physical grounds for their being independent purely on the basis of the causal structure. Consequently, a model in which X 1 , X 2 remain independent conditional on a common effect B is not quite in contradiction with BK and hence is not ruled out by the CMA; however it can be seen as an example of fine-tuning and ruled out on that basis.
The quantitative version of Reichenbach's Principle of Common Causes RP1 must be distinguished from what has been called the qualitative version of the principle [23] , which can be stated as follows:
RP2. Reichenbach's Principle of Common Causes ('qualitative' version): If neither of X 1 , X 2 is a cause of the other and they have no shared ancestors, then they are statistically independent:
Note that RP2 can be obtained from RP1 by setting C = ∅, hence it is a strictly weaker principle. (It is 'qualitative' insofar as it is purely a statement about the presence or absence of a correlation, whereas RP1 can be read as a quantitative statement about the 'strength' of a conditional correlation. However, inasmuch as all correlations are conditional, the qualitative/quantitative distinction is a misnomer). The status of RP2 in physics is a very interesting matter. Essentially, it captures the highly intuitive fact that two systems with independent histories tend to be initially uncorrelated. In fact, classical causal models are commonly assumed to satisfy an additional principle beyond those described above that is closely related to RP2, namely:
PI. The Principle of Independence: If neither of X 1 , X 2 is a cause of the other and they have shared ancestors, then one generally expects them to be correlated:
This is quite intuitive: whereas RP2 states that systems with no shared history tend to be independent, PI affirms the complement, namely that systems with a shared history tend to be correlated. In fact, PI can be seen as equivalent to asserting that the 'causal inverse' of RP2 does not hold. The causal inverse of RP2 would state that X 1 , X 2 are independent if neither is a cause of the other and they have no shared descendants (but might have shared ancestors) -PI rejects this conclusion when shared ancestors are present. (In the literature, 'Reichenbach's Principle' is sometimes assumed to include PI, but it should be noted that this is a strictly stronger version of the principle than merely the union of RP1 and RP2). Despite its intuitive grounding in experience, the principle PI has drawn extensive criticism from Price [14] , who has argued that while it can be justified for macroscopic systems, its validity in the microscopic domain should be questioned (more will be said on this later in Sec. III C).
The Markov Condition from graphical rules
There is a certain sense in which the Markov Condition can always be reduced to some combination of the three principles RP1,SSO and BK. This is formalized as the d-separation theorem [1] . The theorem states that every conditional independence in P (X) that is implied by the MC relative to a DAG G(X) can be read directly from G(X) by checking whether the pathways between the variables in question are 'blocked' or 'unblocked' according to the above three principles.
To see how this works, suppose that U,V and W are disjoint sets of nodes in a DAG G(X), and suppose that P (X) satisfies the MC relative to G(X). Intuitively, the sets U,V can only be correlated in P (X) if there is some causal path between them. To find out if they remain correlated conditional on W, it should suffice to examine each of these paths and determine whether the correlation persists along that path, or is 'blocked' by conditioning on the set W. The path is said to be blocked by W iff at least one of the following graphical conditions holds:
There is a fork A ← C → B on the path where C is in W; g-SSO. There is a chain A → C → B on the path where C is in W; g-BK. There is a collider A → C ← B on the path where C is not in W and has no descendants in W.
The significance of a path being 'blocked' in this way is that if all paths between U,V are blocked by W, then the d-separation theorem states that U and V are independent conditional on W in P (X) according to MC. There is a clear resemblance between the three graphical conditions of d-separation listed above, and the corresponding principles RP1,SSO and BK. The d-separation theorem tells us that the MC can be stated in a purely graphical form, and that in this graphical form every conditional independence relation can be decomposed into a set of path independences, each of which arises through one of the three principles mentioned above. This graphical way of representing independences will prove to be very useful when we consider the quantum analog in Section III D.
The question remains: why should the Markov Condition (and its associated properties RP1,SSO and BK) be expected to hold for classical systems under ideal conditions? For the causal realist, the claim that MC holds under ideal conditions is essentially a theorem: one begins with a model of causal mechanisms as real ontological structures that are postulated to exist, and from their properties one derives the MC (See, for example, Theorem 1.4.1 in Pearl [1] ).
Alternatively, one can take a pragmatic approach as is done in Woodward [3] , and in Spirtes, Glymour & Scheines [2] . There, the MC is regarded as an empirical principle: we are justified in assuming that it holds in certain cases simply because it has been previously observed to hold in many similar cases. A drawback of this view is that it provides no insight into why the principle holds within its domain of empirical success, and therefore no guidance as to how it might be extended beyond this domain.
From the conventionalist point of view, neither of these approaches is entirely satisfactory. On one hand, one does not wish to appeal to externally existing causal mechanisms to derive the MC, but on the other hand, it seems that the pragmatic approach simply evades the question. The view advocated in the present work is that the MC should be understood as defining what is meant by 'classical causality', as opposed to quantum or other types of causal relations that might conceivably be observed. Thus, we allow that causality, as conceived by the conventionalist, is a broader concept than what is captured by the assumption MC, and that one can conceivably observe causal systems that violate some part of MC and thus cannot be said to obey classical causality. Taking quantum systems to be the paradigmatic example of this latter type, the present paper is an attempt to understand what exactly constitutes a notion of 'quantum causality', via the construction of a Quantum Causal Model.
It should be noted that a still stronger view of the status of MC is possible within the conventionalist framework: if one could provide some independent definition of what it means for a system to be 'classical' without appealing to ontological causal structure, then it might be possible to derive the MC as a consequence of this definition. However, whether a derivation along these lines is possible appears to be an open question.
D. Counterfactual inferences from causal models
So far we have discussed the definition of a causal model, which consists of a reference behaviour P (X) and a causal graph G(X) that is consistent with this behaviour in accordance with the Markov Condition. It is now time to consider how this model allows us to make inferences about counterfactuals, in particular, about what we would expect if certain interventions were performed, and certain other measurements were not performed. We begin by discussing how to un-perform a measurement.
How to un-perform a non-disturbing measurement
Of the two types of canonical measurements so far discussed, it is the non-disturbing measurements than can be unperformed, that is, for which the causal model contains sufficient information to tell us what would have happened if they had not been measured (hence it is assumed that the measurements to be un-performed are not exogenous). Note that in a Classical Causal Model, there is not much point in un-performing a non-disturbing measurement, because such an operation cannot be used to assist in making causal inferences (precisely because of the non-disturbing nature of the measurement). For this reason, the procedure of un-performing measurements is somewhat trivial and tends to be omitted from standard texts. I provide an account of it here for the sake of completeness, and because it is helpful to contrast it to the procedure for un-performing disturbing measurements on quantum systems discussed later in Sec. III F 2.
Let us write the reference behaviour as P (X, Z|Z + ) with graph G(X, Z). Suppose that Z is to be un-performed: then the goal is to infer what the probability P (X|Z − ) would be if Z were not performed, and in addition, to ask what causal graph G(X) represents the causal structure in this situation. First, from Eqn. (4) one obtains that:
Notice that the new distribution P (X|Z − ) necessarily satisfies the CMA relative to the DAG G(X, Z) in which Z is treated as a 'latent' variable (however, it generally does not satisfy the MC relative to this DAG). This can be given the following physical interpretation: the causal structure of the system is represented by G(X, Z), whether or not the measurement Z is actually performed. When it is not performed, the system behaves just as if it were performed but not observed. In other words, the performance or non-performance of the non-disturbing measurement Z also does not disturb the causal structure of the system.
Counterfactuals involving interventions
We now return to the task of computing the behaviour P (X|Y, Y do ) resulting from introducing an intervention Y on a variable W ∈ X, given the reference behaviour P (X) and the causal graph G(X). Classical causal models usually provide this as an axiom, namely:
This axiom can be justified on the following grounds. First, from the properties (i),(iv),(v) of interventions (cf Sec. II B 2), it is natural to assume that the causal DAG after the intervention, G(X, Y ), is obtained from G(X) by deleting all incoming arrows to W and then introducing Y as the sole parent of W . If one further assumes that the post-intervention probabilities P (X|Y, Y do ) satisfy the MC relative to G(X, Y ), one obtains a product of factors of the form P (X i |pa(X i ), Y do ), which (except for W ) are exactly the same as their pre-intervention counterparts P (X i |pa(X i ), Y − ) in accordance with properties (ii),(iii). The factor corresponding to W is instead replaced by a Kronecker delta δ(W, Y ) in accordance with property (iv). Writing out the product of these factors, one obtains precisely Eq. (10). As part of the intervention, it is assumed that the distribution of the intervention variable, P (Y |Y do ), is given. The new behaviour including Y is then given by:
E. Summary of Classical Causal Models
In the preceding sections, a Classical Causal Model {P (X), G(X)} was defined as a description of a physical system whose causal relations are given by the DAG G(X). In particular, the reference behaviour of the system P (X) is constrained by the causal relations according to the Markov Condition MC, or more generally by the Causal Markov Assumption CMA in cases where latent variables are present. It is the MC, and in particular the quantitative Reichenbach Principle RP1, that implies inequality constraints on classical correlations. Furthermore, the model provides information about how the system would behave if some of the non-disturbing measurements had not been performed, or if some of them had been intervened upon. In the next section, it will be seen whether similar models can be constructed for describing the normal and counterfactual behaviour of quantum systems. Considering these questions, one encounters problems related to each. The first problem has to do with canonical measurements. Unlike with classical systems, measurements on quantum systems tend to be disturbing measurements in the sense defined in Sec. II B 1. This raises the question of whether a disturbing measurement can possibly also be canonical, or whether causal relations are necessarily based upon measurements that are non-disturbing. The second problem stems from the first and concerns counterfactuals: if canonical measurements are disturbing, then the classical recipe (Eqn. (4)) no longer applies. How, then, do we compute what would happen if the disturbing measurement were not performed? The third problem is about explanation. The quantitative part of Reichenbach's Principle of Common Causes does not seem to hold when the common causes are measurements that result in a quantum entangled state of the system. Thus, one must decide whether it is possible to salvage the quantitative part of this principle or give it up entirely. If it is given up, one is left with the task of explaining where the bounds on quantum correlations come from.
After describing these problems in more detail, I will argue that an essential property of canonical measurements is that they are informationally complete. This naturally leads to the conclusion that, for quantum systems, they are also necessarily disturbing measurements. To describe how the system would behave if a disturbing quantum measurement were not performed, I draw on a key result of Quantum Bayesianism, which applies directly to this question. Finally, I argue that the properties of canonical measurements imply that the quantitative part of Reichenbach's Principle is false for quantum systems. Constraints on the strength of quantum correlations are not derived directly from any analog of this Principle, rather, they are to be derived indirectly from the counterfactual law that describes what would happen if measurements were not performed.
Screening-off and measurement disturbance
One of the defining features of Classical Causal Models is that, apart from the exogenous variables, all canonical measurements are non-disturbing. Furthermore, these measurements satisfy the MC, and in particular the sequential screening-off condition SSO described in Sec. II C. It will now be shown that measurements on quantum systems cannot simultaneously satisfy these conditions, i.e. they cannot both be canonical non-disturbing measurements and satisfy SSO.
Consider the following case: let A be an exogenous variable representing the choice of preparation of a system, and let B, C be the outcomes of subsequent measurements made sequentially on the system. Classically, the causal graph would be A → B → C and SSO would therefore require P (A, B, C) = P (C|B)P (B|A)P (A), or equivalently, P (A, C|B) = P (A|B)P (C|B).
If the system is a quantum system, this conditional independence implies that the post-measurement state conditioned on B is independent of the variable A. Furthermore, to fulfill property (iii) of canonical measurements (recall Sec. II B, the outcome 'B' should be a pure state for each value of B (see Appendix A for details). However, if the post-measurement state conditioned on B is pure, then it necessarily represents a disturbance, i.e. one can find measurements A, C for which P (A, C|B − ) = B P (A, C|B, B + ), which violates the definition of non-disturbance given in Sec. II B 1.
As an explicit example, let A, B, C be measurements on a spin-half particle. Let the first and last measurements A, C be projective measurements in the Pauli σ Z basis, and let B be a measurement in the complementary σ X basis. Then
exhibits no correlations, since the intermediate σ X measurement B results in a state that is superposed along the σ Z -axis, causing the final σ Z measurement to give a random result. In conclusion, one cannot maintain both the SSO for sequential canonical measurements and the assumption that these measurements are non-disturbing.
Common causes and entanglement
Quantum entanglement poses yet another threat to the MC. Let a quantum system be prepared by a measurement A and let B, C now be the outcomes of measurements performed on distinct 'parts' of the system, possibly at the same time. Classically, this scenario would be represented by the causal graph B ← A → C, where A is the common cause of B, C.
Remark: If the system is quantum, there is a subtlety about this division into 'parts'. On one hand, it seems that a two-level quantum system could not act as a common cause, because it cannot be further sub-divided into distinct parts. On the other hand, one can imagine flipping a coin and either performing the measurement B or C on the system depending on the outcome of the coin toss. This would seem to qualify the two-level system as a common cause of B, C, but then what are the 'parts' into which it was supposed to have been divided? This apparent puzzle is not of any fundamental significance. There are many ways to resolve it; the solution most fitting for the present model is given in Appendix B. Essentially a two-level system is allowed to be a common-cause of arbitrarily many variables, precisely because it can be sent probabilistically to any one of them. The question about dividing it into 'parts' is a red herring: the arrows in a causal graph do not here represent the trajectories of physical systems.
Returning to the example, the MC would in this case imply the factorization condition:
which follows from RP1. Note that when the state produced by measurement A (conditional on the outcome) is entangled between the parts measured by B, C, the factorization condition (12) cannot immediately be satisfied. Classically, it would be usual in this situation to suppose that there are additional latent common causes L responsible for the correlations. There are two strong reasons why this explanation does not work in the present example. First, it may be the case that the state prepared by the measurement A is pure (indeed it must be the case if the measurement is to be canonical). To suppose that a pure state is an incomplete description of the common causes is equivalent to supposing that quantum mechanics is an incomplete description of reality, a point of view that has little support nowadays due to the various no-go theorems that have been leveled against it. The second closely related reason is that if we allow the bases of the measurements B, C to vary, as represented by variables S B , S C corresponding to the measurement settings (see Fig. 5 ), then the MC for this causal graph implies the constraint:
which is known to imply Bell inequalities on the marginal distribution P (A, B, C, S B , S C ). These inequalities can be (and have been) violated by certain strongly entangled states, and so the hypothesis of latent common causes L as represented in Fig. 5 must be ruled out according to the CMA (plus the usual assumption of no-fine-tuning). As a final recourse, one could propose to drop the assumption of no fine-tuning. Even then, the only remaining causal graphs consistent with the probabilities would require causal relations that seem highly counter-intuitive, such as causal influences between space-like separated measurement events, or a conspiratorial collaboration between the choices of measurement bases and the hidden variable. In summary, the phenomenon of quantum entanglement cannot be easily reconciled with the classical CMA.
B. The Born rule as a counterfactual law
Before turning to the solution to the problems proposed in the previous section, it is necessary to review a key result in the literature known to the Quantum Bayesians as the Urgleichung. The physical meaning of this equation is a topic of ongoing discussion amongst QBists, but the interpretation put forward by Fuchs and Schack in Ref. [24] lends itself especially well to building a quantum causal model in the conventionalist spirit. In this section, we introduce the Urgleichung and elaborate on its interpretation as given in Ref. [24] , which emphasizes its counterfactual aspect.
To begin with, recall the 'causal chain' example of Sec. III A 1 of a system prepared by a measurement A and subsequently subjected to measurements B, C, as represented by the causal graph A → B → C. Let us write the joint distribution as P (A, B, C|B + ), keeping in mind that these are measurements on quantum systems. Let us now ask: what assumptions do we need to make about the measurement B in order to be able to deduce P (A, C|B − ), that is, in order to know what the statistics of A, C would have been if measurement B were not performed ? To this end, we observe that if it were possible to reconstruct the quantum state ρ(A) prior to B from the probabilities P (B|A, B + ), and if we could reconstruct the POVM {E C } from the probabilities P (C|B, B + ), then we could simply use the Born rule, according to which:
Assuming there are no special restrictions on the allowed states ρ(A), these can be reconstructed from the probabilities P (B|A) if and only if B is an informationally complete (IC) measurement. It is convenient to choose B to be a symmetric informationally complete (SIC) measurement, which is defined from a set of projectors {Π B } having the property:
The measurement itself is then described by the SIC-POVM { 1 d Π B }, and the post-measurement state corresponding to the outcome B = b is Π b . The elements of any IC-POVM define a basis for the space of linear operators on the associated Hilbert space. In particular, for a SIC-POVM B, we can expand the state ρ(A) and the POVM elements E C as:
The coefficients α B (A), β B (C) are related to the measurement probabilities according to:
By substituting (16), (17) into the right hand side of the Born Rule (14) , one can establish [24] :
This expression is the Urgleichung. It is just one of a class of expressions that can be obtained using arbitrary informationally complete measurements; however, the form obtained using a SIC-POVM is particularly simple and elegant. Note that the LHS is conditioned on B − (that is, on B not being performed) whereas the RHS is conditioned on B being performed. For the QBists, the equation represents a new probabilistic law of inference that comes into play when quantum systems are involved. A QBist would say that a rational agent would use this rule to make bets on propositions regarding quantum systems, because if they didn't, they would lose money on average to a clever bookkeeper who is aware of the rule. But what exactly is this rational agent making inferences about? According to Ref. [24] , this 'law of inference' tells the rational agent what to expect if the measurement B had not been performed, as a function of the probabilities that they assign in the case that B actually is performed (and its outcome ignored). That is, if the reference behaviour is P (A, C|B + ), the rule tells them how to compute the counterfactual behaviour P (A, C|B − ). In the context of the manipulationist's counterfactual view of causality, the following further interpretation can be put forward. The Urgleichung -being simply the Born rule expressed between certain probabilities -is a causal law, since it tells us how to deduce a system's counterfactual behaviour from its reference behaviour. This gives the first clue as to how to proceed to a quantum causal model.
C. Quantum canonical measurements
We will now see how the QBists' insight allows us to construct a model of quantum causality along similar lines to classical causal models. To begin, we ask the crucial question: what are the canonical measurements in a quantum causal model? Recall that a canonical measurement is defined as one that provides 'sufficient' information about the system in order to make 'counterfactual predictions', that is, how it would have responded if a different measurement had been performed instead. QBism tells us that this is only possible if the measurement is represented by an informationally complete POVM. Furthermore, to fulfill property (iii) of canonical measurements, the post-measurement state conditioned on the outcome of the IC-POVM should be a pure state. This leads us to the first 'axiom' of a QBist approach to quantum causal models:
QR. Quantum causal relata: The canonical measurements of a quantum causal model must be informationally complete measurements, that is, they must be measurements described by IC-POVMs that result in pure postmeasurement states conditional on their outcomes.
The axiom QR already has some interesting consequences. First, as mentioned in Sec III A 1, it implies that the canonical measurements must be disturbing measurements. Secondly, it implies that the canonical measurements cannot be projections onto a single basis of Hilbert space. Thus, for example, although the eigenstates of spin in the σ Z direction form a basis of the Hilbert space of a spin-half particle, a measurement in the σ Z -basis (which results in a pure state) nevertheless cannot be a canonical measurement, because it is not informationally complete. Intuitively, the outcome statistics of a σ Z measurement cannot be used to deduce what the statistics would have been if we had performed a σ Y -measurement instead. (Generally speaking, a measurement needs to have at least d 2 distinct outcomes if it is to have a hope of being informationally complete, where d is the Hilbert space dimension). It remains to narrow down which particular class of IC-measurements should serve as the canonical measurements. Before that, it is important to discuss a potential trap.
The dangers of classical intuition
In constructing a quantum causal model, it is natural to take classical causal models as a source of guidance. However, we must not be too strict in our adherence to the patterns of classical systems. It is to be expected, after all, that sufficient restrictions on quantum systems will result in a theory that is essentially classical, because classical mechanics can always be obtained as a limiting case of the more general quantum theory. If we are too ardent in our pursuit of the countours of classical causal models, therefore, we risk imposing a classical structure on the quantum substrate, obscuring those very features of an essentially quantum nature that it is our goal to elucidate. Classical causal models serve as guidance insofar as they convey to us the spirit of causal law, in its general principles and ideas, but in carrying these over to the new quantum domain, we must be careful to respect the spirit, not the letter, of the law. We must, in short, not dictate to quantum systems how to behave, but provide broad structural boundaries in which they can freely express themselves for what they are.
As an instructive example, consider again the single particle. It was noted before that the quantum state prior to measurement cannot be reconstructed by a spin-σ Z measurement. However, this is only true so long as coherence in the σ Z basis is possible. If one wished to insist that σ Z measurements should be canonical, one could enforce as part of the definition of canonical measurements a decohering mechanism in the σ Z basis, which would effectively restrict the state space to statistical mixtures of σ Z eigenstates. With respect to this restricted state space, σ Z measurements are indeed informationally complete. However, the resulting model contains no quantum features whatsoever -it is for all practical purposes a classical causal model. Should one then conclude that there is no such thing as quantum causality, since it is reducible to classical causality? Of course not! One has not allowed sufficient room for quantum causality to express itself.
Canonical measurements and entanglement
To help narrow down the quantum canonical measurements, recall the common-cause example from Sec. III A 2, in which a system A is subdivided into two parts, measured independently by B and C. Following the aforementioned axiom QR, the state ρ(A) conditioned on the outcome of A should be pure, prior to the measurements B, C. Apart from that, we have no further guidance as to its properties. If, for example, ρ(A) := |Ψ(A) Ψ(A)| is entangled, then the factorization P (A, B, C) = P (B|A)P (C|A)P (A) fails to hold, leading to the conflict with the CMA that was discussed in Sec. III A 2. To rescue the CMA, one might therefore consider imposing that the state ρ(A) should be a product state between the disjoint subspaces measured by B and C, that is, |Ψ(A) A = |ψ(A) B ⊗ |φ(A) C . This can easily be arranged, since the tensor product of two IC-POVMs is again an IC-POVM. Thus, one could require that a canonical measurement should factorize into a tensor product of local IC-measurements on the subspaces indicated by subsequent measurements on the system, such that the post-measurement state conditioned on the outcome is not only pure, but is also a product state (hence not entangled) with respect to the subspaces that are subsequently measured. This would allow a remarkable feat: to satisfy the axiom QR of canonical quantum measurements and to satisfy the CMA of Classical Causal Models!
The main objection to this approach is that it violates property (i) of canonical measurements outlined in Sec. II B, as follows. According to the above suggestion, a measurement can only be canonical if it factorizes according to the subsystems that are identified in subsequent measurements. This implies that in order to say whether a given measurement on a system is canonical or not would require one to know in advance what other measurements will follow it, and this contradicts the property (i). Another more general objection is that enforcing factorization by fiat in this way seems to be imposing classical intuitions where they do not belong, as warned against in the previous section. Entanglement is such a characteristic feature of quantum systems that it seems to deserve its place within any reasonable model of 'quantum causality'. It is admitted however that this argument has less force than the preceding one. In conclusion, whatever the canonical quantum measurements are, they cannot be made to factorize on common causes in any way that respects what is understood by 'canonical measurement' in a causal model. Without the ability to enforce factorization in the spirit of RP1 as a constraining principle, one is left without further guidance as to the form of the canonical IC-measurements. An appeal to Ockham's razor, whereby one chooses the form that results in the simplest and most elegant expressions, leads then to the proposition that the canonical measurements should be SIC -POVMs.
Finally, there remains the question of what the post-measurement state should be (conditional on the outcome of the SIC-POVM). So far, it has only been decided that it must be a pure state, but otherwise the possibilities remain numerous; they include, for instance, measurements in which the post-measurement state is a randomly assigned pure state independent of the measurement outcome. The latter case would be a clear candidate for an intervention on the quantum system, as it would effectively break the causal dependence of the outgoing state on any previous measurements. Such interventions will be taken up in Sec. III F 3 -for the present, however, the task is to identify a particular type of canonical quantum measurement that maintains the causal dependence on its parents, so as to take over the role that was played by the non-disturbing measurements in Classical Causal Models, which serve as intermediate nodes in the causal graph. The simplest option is then to apply the Lüders rule, according to which the post-measurement state for the outcome X = x of the SIC-POVM { Ideally, the causal conventionalist would like to define a SIC-measurement purely in terms of its probabilistic properties, rather than in terms of its Hilbert space representation. This will be done later in Sec. III D. Before that, however, it is necessary to uncover exactly what these probabilistic properties are that characterize SIC-measurements. To begin with, it can be observed that the following principles, which were found to hold for classical causal models (cf. Sec. II C ), also are valid in a quantum causal model subject to QR: SSO. Sequential screening-off : Suppose X 1 causes X 2 and they have no shared ancestors, and every path connecting X 1 to X 2 is intercepted by a variable in D. Then P (X 1 X 2 |D) = P (X 1 |D)P (X 2 |D).
BK. Berkson's rule:
Suppose neither of X 1 , X 2 is a cause of the other and they have no shared ancestors, and suppose B is a common descendant of X 1 , X 2 ; then one generally expects them to be correlated conditional on B, i.e. that P (X 1 X 2 |B) = P (X 1 |B)P (X 2 |B).
RP2. Reichenbach's Principle of Common Causes (qualitative version):
If neither of X 1 , X 2 is a cause of the other and they have no shared ancestors, then they are statistically independent: P (X 1 X 2 ) = P (X 1 )P (X 2 ).
The intuition behind these three principles is simple: SSO holds because the post-measurement state conditioned on D is pure and independent of X 1 ; BK holds for essentially the same reason as in the classical case (conditioning on joint properties of independent variables can render them statistically dependent), and RP2 holds because independent projective measurements performed on two initially uncorrelated parts of a system (eg. the two independent sets of ancestors of X 1 and X 2 ) necessarily results in measurement statistics that are uncorrelated.
So far, these conclusions have not led us far from the established literature: all quantum causal models proposed to date either endorse these principles or are at least compatible with them. For example, although Refs. [16, 25] permit nodes that do not satisfy SSO, they are not inconsistent with the assumption that all nodes should satisfy it in an 'ideal' experiment. Although BK is rarely mentioned explicitly, nothing in existing proposals can be found to contradict it. On the contrary, one article that does explicitly discuss BK in the context of quantum systems concludes that not only does it continue to hold in the quantum case, it also becomes stronger in the sense that conditioning on a common effect of X 1 , X 2 can induce correlations between them that are stronger than what would be classically possible [12, 26] . Finally, it is significant that RP1 seems to be universally rejected in the literature (as in the present work); indeed, even in the model of Allen et. al. [13] , which maintains a quantum analog of RP1, the authors are forced to re-interpret the principle as not referring directly to probabilities, thereby still accommodating its violation at the probabilistic level. Comparing these principles to the classical case, it is easy to get the impression that the sole change that occurs in moving to quantum mechanics is a weakening of RP1 by replacing it with RP2. However, this impression is misleading: the axiom QR has some more interesting consequences up its sleeve that so far have not been considered in the literature. One has, for instance: BK*. Causal inverse of Berkson's rule: Suppose neither of X 1 , X 2 is a cause of the other and they have no shared descendants, and suppose B is a common ancestor of X 1 , X 2 ; then one generally expects them to be correlated conditional on B, i.e. that P (X 1 X 2 |B) = P (X 1 |B)P (X 2 |B).
The principle BK* follows from the fact that the post-measurement states are SIC-projectors on the state of the local subsystem, which do not factorize into a tensor product of states on any smaller subsystems, and therefore tend to exhibit correlations in subsequent measurements. BK* is so named because it happens to be the 'causal inversion' of BK, obtained by switching the direction of all causal arrows, hence interchanging ancestors and descendants where they appear in the description. Note that BK* contradicts RP1, since it implies that X 1 , X 2 should typically be correlated conditional on B even when B is the sole common cause. Thus, BK* represents a step beyond what is possible in classical causal models.
One also has:
SRP. Symmetric Reichenbach Principle (qualitative):
If neither of X 1 , X 2 is a cause of the other, then they are statistically independent: P (X 1 X 2 ) = P (X 1 )P (X 2 ).
Note that SRP implies RP2 as a special case, and therefore SRP represents a strictly stronger principle. This strengthening comes about because if one performs a SIC-measurement on the maximally mixed state then it produces a maximally mixed state (provided one does not condition on its outcome), and hence will not have the power to induce correlations in later measurements on the system. This implies that two variables X 1 , X 2 are independent even if they have a shared history (provided one does not condition on that history).
Note that SRP clashes with the Principle of Independence PI discussed in Sec. II C . At first glance, this would seem to imply that physical systems remain uncorrelated even after interacting, which would seem very odd indeed. However, when interpreted with appropriate caution, SRP is not as so unnatural. The claim being made is merely that if one takes care to construct a reference experiment for a quantum causal model such that all variables represent SIC-measurements (and the initial state is completely unknown), then it is true that measurements on systems for which neither is a cause of the other will be uncorrelated, if one does not condition on other variables. Of course, correlations will appear as soon as one conditions on the outcomes of other measurements, such as their common ancestors. There is nothing surprising in this: we are only accustomed to finding correlations between measurements on a shared system in those situations where we know something about the prior state of the system. It is not common in our experience to witness measurements on completely unknown states -we always implicitly condition on the preparation procedure. The quantum causal model simply makes this conditioning explicit. SRP is then a natural consequence of this assumption, since if we don't condition on the preparation, the unknown system remains completely unknown, and so of course it cannot become more correlated through interactions.
Having hopefully eased the reader into the idea that there is nothing especially strange or alarming about the fact that PI is violated for quantum systems, the following section proposes a general analog of the Markov Condition for quantum systems, based on the above principles SSO,BK and SRP.
D. The Quantum Markov Condition
The graphical representation of the classical Markov Condition by the d-separation theorem (recall Section II C) suggests a way to define the analogous Quantum Markov Condition starting from a graphical interpretation of the principles SSO, BK, BK*, SRP that were found to hold for quantum systems in the previous section. To this end, the following is postulated to hold for the statistics of quantum systems with a given causal structure:
QMC. Quantum Markov Condition (graphical version): Let U,V,W be disjoint subsets of variables in a DAG G(X). A distribution P (X) is said to satisfy the Quantum Markov Condition relative to G(X) if P (UV|W) = P (U|W)P (V|W) holds whenever every path between U and V is blocked by W. A path between two variables is said to be 'blocked' by the set W iff at least one of the following conditions holds: g-SSO: There is a chain A → C → B along the path whose middle member C is in W; g-BK: There is a collider A → C ← B on the path where C is not in W and has no descendants in W. g-BK*: There is a fork A ← C → B on the path where C is not in W and has no ancestors in W.
(Note: the graphical interpretation of SRP would be equivalent to the conjunction of g-BK* and g-BK and so it is redundant here).
It is natural to wonder whether this graphical definition of the QMC has an equivalent formulation as a statement about the factorization of P (X) relative to a DAG, analogous to the form in which the MC was introduced in Eq. (7). On one hand, it is simple to find factorization conditions that necessarily hold, but which generally do not express every conditional independence that is implied by the QMC. I conjecture that such a representation is possible, although I was unable to derive it. Fortunately, the graphical statement of the QMC is much easier to work with than an equivalent definition in terms of a factorization of the joint probability distribution would be, and this graphical form of the QMC immediately presents a quantum version of d-separation.
A first observation is that classical and quantum causal models satisfy essentially different sets of conditional independence relations for the same causal structure. There is some overlap, since any conditional independence that is purely derived from applications of g-SSO or g-BK will apply to both quantum and classical systems. However, classical systems may obey independences that don't hold in the quantum case (due to RP1) and quantum systems may obey independences that don't hold classically (due to SRP).
There is, however, potentially some flexibility regarding the status of SRP in classical systems. The only obstacle to the idea that a classical system can be made to satisfy SRP under ideal conditions is the implicit assumption of PI, which however is not considered an integral part of the classical Markov Condition, but rather an empirically plausible addendum to it. It is therefore an intriguing open question whether classical systems could be shown to obey SRP under certain conditions, perhaps if one restricts attention to deterministic (hence time-reversible) classical systems.
If indeed the classical MC were to be extended to include SRP, then one could regard quantum systems as obeying a fundamentally more general conception of causality whose manifestation in the case of a reference experiment is a set of constraints on the probabilities that are strictly weaker than those implied by classical causality. Thus, a causal structure would imply the strongest set of constraints (those given by MC) on classical systems, whereas it would imply only a subset of these (the ones given by QMC) on quantum systems with the same causal structure. This means that quantum causal models would be able to model all phenomena that possess a classical causal model (and would do so using the same causal graph), but also would have the capacity to model a much wider range of observed phenomena. For example, the behaviour exhibited in a Bell-inequality violating experiment can be seen to satisfy the QMC but not the MC relative to the 'common cause' DAG of Fig. 5 .
Finally, in the case where it is suspected that certain 'hidden measurements' have been performed whose outcomes are unknown, these can as before be represented by latent variables L, and in that case a weaker condition analogous to the classical CMA holds:
QCMA. The Quantum Causal Markov Assumption: The reference behaviour P (X) of the observed variables X of a physical system in a suitably designed experiment can always be expressed as:
such that P (X, L) satisfies the QMC relative to some DAG G(X, L).
The above definitions of the Quantum Markov Condition QMC and the Quantum Causal Markov Assumption QCMA were motivated by the properties of SIC-measurements in quantum systems, namely SSO, BK, BK*, SRP. A possible flaw in the approach taken so far is that the latter principles were all derived by assuming that the quantum system and the measurements on it are represented by Hilbert space operators. This approach sits well with the causal realist, who in any case takes the fundamental elements to be operators on Hilbert space and treats the probabilistic aspects of states and measurements as being derived from these. To obtain a model that is more in keeping with the causal conventionalist viewpoint, it is necessary to perform a kind of boot-strapping operation whereby SIC-measurements are defined by their probabilistic properties. (Note that this is reminiscent of how the QBists bootstrap from the Born rule: they first use it to derive the Urgleichung as a probabilistic consequence of quantum theory, and then they reverse the roles of the two principles, taking the Urgleichung as the fundamental principle and proposing that the Born rule should be derived from it).
For the following conventionalist definition of SIC-measurements, the terms state, measurement, dimension, etc, should be understood as referring to the definitions of these terms in an operational probabilistic framework, that is, as probabilistic properties of a system and not the Hilbert space representations thereof. For example, the dimension d of a SIC-measurement having d 2 outcomes does not refer to the dimension of the Hilbert space of the measured subsystem, but rather to its 'informational dimension', which is the maximum number of ways to prepare the system such that the preparations can be perfectly distinguished by performing a single measurement. For more details of operational probabilistic notions, see for example Ref. [6] . The conventionalist's definition of a SIC-measurement is then stated as follows:
SIC-measurement (conventionalist definition):
A SIC-measurement X on a subsystem of informational dimension d X is a canonical measurement having d 2 X outcomes that satisfies the following properties: (i) After performing a SIC, the state of the subsystem is pure conditional on the measurement outcome; (ii) After performing a SIC on the maximally mixed state and ignoring the outcome, the state of the subsystem is again the maximally mixed state; (iii) When performing a SIC on a subsystem in the maximally mixed state, the probability of obtaining each outcome is equal to P (X) =
for all values of X; (iv) For a set of SIC-measurements X whose causal relations to each other are specified by a DAG G(X), the properties SSO, BK, BK*, SRP all hold.
From the results of this section, the first part of a definition of a quantum causal model in the conventionalist spirit can now be stated: it consists of a reference behaviour P (X) and a DAG G(X) such that X are SIC-measurements and P (X) satisfies the QMC relative to G(X). Still missing from this picture is a set of rules connecting the behaviour of the system in the reference experiment to its behaviour in counterfactual experiments; these will be explored in the following sections.
E. Representation in terms of an 'underlying' quantum circuit
This section briefly describes how, given a quantum causal model {P (X), G(X)}, a generic quantum circuit can be constructed that can produce the observed probabilities. Although the main aim of this work is to argue that such a representation is strictly unnecessary for the purposes of causal inference, it would be overstepping the mark to say that such a structure is not practically useful -on the contrary, the usefulness of abstract constructions like quantum circuits is the reason why we prefer to deal with them instead of with probabilities when doing calculations. A quantum circuit plays the analogous role to a quantum causal model as the so-called functional parameters play in a classical causal model: they provide an explicit representation of processes acting on states that is sufficient to explain the statistics P (X) in accordance with the causal structure given by G(X). For the models considered here, the following considerations are sufficient to obtain a generic quantum circuit representation.
(i) Every variable X i ∈ X is associated with a SIC-measurement acting on a Hilbert space having dimension d Xi .
(ii) A variable X i is a cause of X j in G(X) iff there is a wire from the output of X i to the input of X j . (iii) Moreover, X i is a parent of X j only if there is a wire in the circuit from the output of X i to the input of X j that is not intercepted by any of the other measurements in X. (iv) Between measurements, wires in the circuit may be subject to arbitrary unitary gates, provided these respect the wiring structure implied by G(X), that is, provided that there is a causal path in G(X) from every node that has an input to the unitary gate to every node that is connected to an output of the unitary gate. (v) The input and output dimensions of the unitary maps are to be chosen such that the states entering at each SIC-measurement X i have the requisite dimensionality d Xi . To achieve this, the circuit can be supplemented with any number of ancillary subsystems of any dimension, prepared in the maximally mixed state (these also serve as the entire input to measurements that are exogenous in the DAG). (vi) Wires in the circuit may be discarded at any point without measurement, so as to reduce the dimensionality of subsystems where needed.
Examples of causal graphs and their possible corresponding quantum circuits can be found in Sec. III F 3 (see Fig.  7 ). The meaning of a causal model's representation as a quantum circuit presents a useful way of understanding the difference between the conventionalist and realist approaches to causality. (For the sake of clarity, the possibility of latent variables will be ignored in what follows -it is straightforward to extend the argument to include them).
The conventionalist takes it as an empirical fact that experiments on quantum systems can be designed so that the probabilities P (X) satisfy the QMC relative to some hypothesized causal graph G(X). It is then an experimentally testable conjecture whether this applies to all physical systems. Similarly, it is a matter of conjecture that when a system does obey the QMC relative to a DAG, then a quantum circuit exists that conforms to the DAG as described by the above rules which can reproduce the data; however, the existence or non-existence of such a circuit representation is not of fundamental significance, so long as the QMC is upheld.
For the causal realist, on the other hand, they key conjecture to be experimentally tested is whether or not all physical systems have a representation as a quantum circuit. The question of whether such systems can also be made to satisfy the QMC under ideal experimental conditions is of no fundamental importance. In cases where it is possible, the QMC is justified only insofar as it is derived as a prediction of the underlying quantum circuit.
Thus, to the causal realist the quantum circuit represents something real, whereas to the conventionalist it is merely a convenient shorthand for the directly observable phenomena captured in the causal model {P (X), G(X)}.
F. Modelling disturbances in a quantum causal model
Classical causal models were characterized by two basic kinds of canonical measurements: the non-disturbing measurements, which could be represented by variables having causes in the system, and interventions, which could not have any causes in the system (recall Sec. II B 2). Of these two types, only interventions were disturbing measurements, meaning that they required special rules to determine how the system's behaviour would change in response to the measurement, as opposed to the effects of non-disturbing measurements, which can be computed merely by Bayesian updating.
Turning to quantum systems, there are again two basic types of measurements: the SIC-measurements, which are represented by variables that may have causes within the system, and interventions, which will shortly be seen to have much the same properties as their classical counterparts, particularly that they have no causes in the system and they are disturbing measurements. What is peculiar about the quantum case is that the SIC-measurements, unlike their classical counterparts, are now disturbing measurements. This disturbance has been seen to manifest itself in a very particular way: it requires a special rule (the Urgleichung) to tell us what the probabilities would have been if a SIC-measurement had not been performed on the system; the details will be taken up shortly in Sec. III F 2.
Before describing the particular rules that govern how a quantum causal model changes under disturbing measurements, it will be useful to consider what might be said about disturbing measurements in general. To avoid confusion in the following sections, it will be helpful in what follows to recall the distinction between intracontextual and extracontextual counterfactuals mentioned in Sec. II.
No-signalling and its causal inverse
The principle of no-signalling was mentioned in passing in Sec. II B 2 where it was invoked to define interventions on classical systems. As it pertains to disturbing measurements in general, the principle may be stated as follows:
NS. No-signalling (in causal models): Suppose Z is a disturbing measurement in a system. Let A be the causal ancestors of Z, let D be the descendants of Z, and let R be the rest. The principle of no-signalling states that the performance or non-performance of Z cannot affect the probabilities of A, R. Formally, given a causal model consisting of a behaviour P (A, D, R, Z|Z + ) and DAG G(A, D, R, Z), one has:
As stated, this principle applies to extracontextual counterfactuals. This might cause confusion in readers who are more used to seeing the label 'no-signalling' applied to certain conditional independence relations that obtain from the classical MC. A good example of this is the Bell graph of Fig. 5 , where the MC implies for instance that P (B|S B S C ) = P (B|S B ). This indicates that the probability of the outcome B depends only on the value of its local setting S B and not on the value of the 'remote' setting S C -hence one can say there is 'no signalling from S C to B'. This is clearly an intracontextual definition of no-signalling. In fact, no-signalling of this intracontextual kind is invariably an application of BK and RP2 to the case in which one of the variables is exogenous (and is called a 'setting') while the other one is not. If the setting is not a cause of the other variable, and one does not condition on a common descendant (not triggering BK), then RP2 implies the variables must be independent in the reference behaviour. In the present work, the term 'no-signalling' is not used for such intracontextual conditional independences, but is reserved only for the extracontextual definition given above, which relates the reference behaviour to counterfactual behaviours in which a variable is disturbed or manipulated.
It is worth pointing out that NS only applies under the assumption that the descendants D of Z are not conditioned upon. Indeed, if one were allowed to fix the values of future variables (often called 'post-selection') then it is entirely possible to send information to variables that are not in the causal future of the manipulated variable Z. A simple example serves to illustrate this point. Whether or not Homer Simpson decides to get a beer (variable G), and whether or not the fridge contains beer (variable B) are independent variables that are both contributing causes of whether or not Homer is feeling satisfied two minutes later (variable S). He will be satisfied whenever G and B are the same, that is if he wants beer and there is some, but also if he doesn't want beer and there isn't any. Otherwise, he is unsatisfied, either because he wants a beer but doesn't have one, or because the fridge is cluttered up with unwanted beer. No-signalling implies, quite reasonably, that Homer cannot cause there to be beer in the fridge simply by deciding to get a beer. On the other hand, if we condition that Homer will be satisfied in the near future, then we would be forced to conclude that (i) if Homer decided to get a beer, there would be one in the fridge, and (ii) if he did not decide to get a beer, there wouldn't be one in the fridge. Of course, there is nothing strange or supernatural about this. The plain fact is that, as a matter of practical reality, we cannot know in advance that Homer will be satisfied, and that is why no-signalling is phenomenologically ubiquitous in our experience. There will be more to say on this topic in Sec. IV C.
In quantum causal models, there is an additional principle governing disturbing measurements. This principle follows from the property of a SIC-measurement that if it is performed on the maximally mixed state it necessarily produces the maximally mixed state. Transformations having this property have been referred to in the literature as being unbiased, and this terminology will be adopted here [27] . In a quantum causal model, an exogenous SICmeasurement is assumed to act on the maximally mixed state, and therefore it is easy to see that for any exogenous variable E that is not conditioned upon, the probabilities of the remaining variables must be identical to what they would be if E were not performed. Now suppose that F is a variable all of whose parents are exogenous. By applying the same logic, if one does not condition on the parents of F , the probabilities of the remaining variables are indifferent as to whether F is performed or not. Following this inductive chain of reasoning, one arrives at the following result: NS*. Causal inverse of no-signalling: Suppose Z is a disturbing measurement in a system of variables that represent unbiased measurements. Then the performance or non-performance of Z cannot affect the probabilities of its non-ancestors, D, R. Formally, given a causal model consisting of a behaviour P (A, D, R, Z|Z + ) and DAG G(A, D, R, Z), then:
The principle NS* is -by what seems to be a remarkable coincidence -the causal inverse of the aforementioned no-signalling principle, obtained from it by reversing the roles of the ancestors and descendants of Z. The meaning of this causal symmetry will be discussed in Sec. IV C. It will be shown in Sec. III F 3 that interventions on quantum systems can be made to have this property also, making it a general feature of quantum causal models.
How to un-perform a quantum measurement
Consider now the problem of un-performing a single canonical quantum measurement Z, that is: given the reference behaviour P (X, Z| Z + ), how does one compute the counterfactual behaviour P (X| Z − )? It will be useful to partition X into the descendants D and ancestors A of Z, and the rest R. Using the principle NS, one obtains:
The problem has thus been reduced to that of finding an expression for P (D|A, R, Z − ) in terms of probabilities derived from P (X, Z| Z + ) := P (D, A, R| Z + ). To achieve this, consider that the probabilities P (Z|A, R, Z + ) represent an agent's prior expectations about the outcomes of the measurement Z, conditioned on the outcomes of the measurements A, R (and on the promise that Z will in fact be performed). Similarly, the probabilities P (D|Z, A, R Z + ) represent the same agent's expectations about the outcomes of future measurements D, conditional on the background knowledge A, R and the fact that Z was now performed and the outcome Z = z was obtained. If one now asks what the agent should expect for the outcomes of D, conditional on A, R, in the event that Z were not performed, then according to QBism the agent should answer using the Urgleichung, namely (recalling Sec. III):
Substituting this into Eqn. (22), one can obtain P (X| Z − ) entirely from the the reference behaviour P (X, Z| Z + ). What, then, is the DAG G(X) that holds for the counterfactual behaviour P (X| Z − )? In Appendix C an argument is given for the following result:
DAG after un-performing a measurement: If P (X, Z| Z + ) satisfies the QMC relative to G(X, Z), then P (X| Z − ) satisfies the QMC relative to the new DAG G(X) obtained from G(X, Z) by the following procedure: (i) Directly connecting every parent of Z to every child of Z; (ii) Deleting Z and its incoming and outgoing arrows.
The resulting DAG G(X) excludes the node Z, but the causal pathways between the remaining nodes X remain intact (see Fig. 6 ). In particular, for any pair of variables A, B ∈ X there is a causal path from A to B in G(X) if and only if such a path already existed in G(X, Z). The only difference between the two DAGs is that some parents of Z might become direct causes of some children of Z, of which they were previously only indirect causes. Physically, this can be interpreted as saying that a canonical quantum measurement only disturbs the causal structure in a local way (it only affects the causal relations of its parents and children), and moreover it is minimally disturbing in the sense that it does not break causal pathways that run through it. The extension of these results to the task of un-performing multiple measurements Z can be carried out by iterating the procedure for a single measurement. FIG. 6 . The causal graph before and after un-performing the measurement Z; the causal pathways from its parents to its children are preserved.
Interventions on quantum systems
As in the classical case, there are potentially many ways to define an 'intervention' on a quantum system. The goal of this section is to propose one definition that is especially suited to the present framework. Recall from Sec. III C that the definition of a SIC-measurement W requires the post-measurement state Π w to be perfectly correlated with the measurement outcome W = w. Alternatively, one could choose to define a new kind of measurement in which the outcome W = w is ignored, and the post-measurement state is chosen randomly from the set of possible pure SIC states, independently of W . To represent this process formally in a way that looks analogous to the classical intervention, a new variable Y is introduced to represent the experimenter's choice of which post-measurement state to prepare. The possible values of Y correspond exactly to the possible values of W , and after the intervention Y has been introduced, it will be assumed to be perfectly correlated with W . The value W = w now does not represent the spontaneous outcome of a SIC-POVM measured on some part of the system, but rather the independent preparation of the state Π w at the experimenter's will (or by some other mechanism independent of the system). In particular, all variables that were previously causes of W in the DAG can no longer be causes of W after the intervention. Formally, an intervention is defined by the following properties (see below for the justifications):
Properties of interventions on quantum systems: Let {P (X), G(X)} be a quantum causal model. A measurement Y introduced into this model is called an intervention on some variable W ∈ X iff the resulting model, denoted {P (X, Y |Y do ), G(X, Y |Y do )}, satisfies the following properties: (i) Y is a direct cause of W and only W ; (ii) The performance or non-performance of the intervention Y on W does not affect the marginal distribution of variables that are not descendants of W . Formally, let A, R denote the non-descendants of W . Then:
(ii)* The performance or non-performance of the intervention Y on W does not affect the marginal distribution of variables that are not ancestors of W . Formally, let D, R denote the non-ancestors of W . Then:
Except for rule (ii)*, which replaces the classical rule (iii), these are exactly the same rules that were used to define interventions in the classical case (cf Sec. II B 2), and their justifications are the same. Rule (ii)* is so labelled because it is the causal inverse of the preceding rule (ii). Just as rule (ii) is justified by NS, the rule (ii)* is justified if we assume that NS* applies to interventions. In particular, it holds when the intervention is a uniformly randomly chosen SIC state, and more generally it is true of any definition of an intervention that satifies the previously mentioned property of being unbiased.
Remark: Despite the beguiling symmetry, the principles NS and NS* are not on identical footing as far as their physical justification goes. While violations of NS are practically taboo in physics, violations of NS* are perfectly commonplace, since the interventions typically performed in the lab are biased. Indeed, great care would have to be taken to eliminate this bias and thereby satisfy NS*. The present decision to focus on the special class of interventions that do satisfy NS* therefore stands in need of justification -this will be given in Sec. IV C. Now consider the key question: given a quantum causal model consisting of a reference behaviour P (X) and a corresponding DAG G(X), what would be the behaviour P (X|Y, Y do ) resulting from introducing an intervention Y on a variable W ∈ X? In the classical case, this relation was given by a simple postulate, Eq. (11), whose motivation depends heavily on the validity of the MC. Now that the latter has been replaced by the QMC, the validity of this postulate may be questioned. To begin with, is it still possible to deduce the counterfactual behaviour P (X|Y, Y do ) just from the reference behaviour P (X|Y − ) and its DAG? In fact, the answer turns out to be "no"! As in the classical case, the causal model consisting of {P (X), G(X)} is compatible with an infinity of distinct possible "functional parameters", which in this case would be represented by different ways of producing the statistics P (X) by a quantum circuit conforming to the causal structure given by G(X). In the classical case, one has the fortunate circumstance that P (X|Y, Y do ) can be defined directly from {P (X), G(X)}, without needing to know anything precise about the supposed underlying functional parameters. However, in the quantum case (so far as it has been formulated) it turns out that the result of an intervention will be different depending on different choices of functional parameters.
This can be illustrated most effectively by considering the simple causal structure of Fig. 7 (a) , and a corresponding circuit diagram that might represent the underlying situation as shown in Fig. 7 (b) , based on a partitioning of the system's Hilbert space into H sys = H 1 ⊗ H 2 .
The result of an intervention Y on W would produce probabilities given by:
where ρ to the measurement of D after propagation thorough U. Thus, to compute the effect of an intervention on W , it would be necessary to reconstruct both ρ
A and E
(1,2) D from the given probabilities P (A, D, W |Y − ), but this is clearly impossible without knowing which unitaries U, V were applied in the underlying circuit. There are essentially two possible responses to this fact. The first would be to take it as a failure of the stated goal of the present project of defining a quantum causal model capable of making predictions about interventions without needing to appeal explicitly to a supposed "underlying mechanism". The above example seems to show that an appeal to such a mechanism is unavoidable in the quantum case, thus vindicating the position of the causal realist.
The second possibility is that a conventionalist causal model can yet be saved by making some additional assumptions. So long as the assumption does not strike us as being too ad hoc, this might provide a satisfactory resolution. Indeed, there is one possibility that presents itself as an answer. Consider the causal graph shown in Fig. 8 (a) and corresponding circuit shown in Fig. 8 (b) . It is exactly the same as that shown in 7, except that an extra SIC-measurement Z has been introduced on H 2 . Fig. 7 , except with an additional SIC-measurement Z performed on system 2. In contrast to that case, the result of an intervention on W (or on Z) in this circuit can be deduced directly from the reference probabilities P (A, D, W, Z) without having to make direct reference to the choice of unitaries U, V. As in the classical case, therefore, the causal model can stand independently of its particular circuit implementation.
In this example, the problem does not arise: since the tensor product of two SIC-POVMs is an informationally-complete POVM, the statistics P (A, D, W, Z|Y − ) now are sufficient to reconstruct both ρ
(1,2) D , implying that it ought to be possible to compute P (A, D, W |Y, Y do ) from the probabilities alone, just as it was possible in the classical case (though of course the rule for doing this will be different -it will be derived shortly).
From this example, it is easy to infer a general property governing the types of DAGs to which this solution can be applied. This is captured by the following definition: QDAG. A DAG for a set of variables X := {X i } is said to be a QDAG iff for every node X i there exists a set of variables containing X i called a 'slice', denoted S i , such that no member of the slice is a cause of any other member, and such that any path from an ancestor of X i to a descendant of X i is intercepted by at least one member of the slice S i , i.e. it contains a causal chain X → Y → Z whose middle member Y is in S i .
If one makes the extra assumption that the DAG is a QDAG, then it is possible to recover a rule that defines the post-intervention probabilities P (A, D, W |Y, Y do ) in terms of the pre-intervention ones P (A, D, W |Y − ). First, let S be the members (other than W ) of the slice containing the intervened-upon node W . The nodes R can then be subdivided according to whether they causally precede or follow the slice: let R D be the subset of R that are descendants of S and let R A be the subset that are ancestors of S (note that this exhausts the nodes in the set R).
Consider the quantum causal model {P (X), G(X)} where G(X) is now assumed to be a QDAG. Proceeding as in the classical case, the post-intervention DAG G(X, Y ) is assumed to be obtained from G(X) by deleting the incoming arrows to W and introducing Y as its sole parent. Note that the resulting G(X, Y ) is automatically a QDAG. Assuming that the post-intervention probabilities satisfy the QMC relative to the new graph, one can easily see that the following conditional independence must hold:
as this is a simple consequence of applying g-SSO to the new QDAG. One therefore obtains:
The third line in the above calculation makes use of the fact that conditioning on Y is equivalent to conditioning on W (and conditioning on both is redundant) since the delta function ensures they have equal values. The last line makes use of properties (ii) and (ii)*. The result is that the terms on the RHS can be obtained entirely from the pre-intervention behaviour P (X). Once the intervention probability P (Y |Y do ) is specified, the rule for interventions on quantum systems is P (X, Y |Y do ) = P (X|Y, Y do )P (Y |Y do ) with P (X|Y, Y do ) given by Eq. (28) . For multiple interventions, this rule can simply be iterated.
How restrictive would it be to assume that the DAGs in quantum causal models are QDAGs? One problem that presents itself with this assumption is that the procedure for un-performing a SIC-measurement, as defined in Sec. III F 2, does not preserve the QDAG structure (for example, note that the non-QDAG of Fig. 7 (a) is obtained by un-performing the measurement Z in the QDAG of Fig. 8 (a) ). This implies that un-performing a measurement does not necessarily result in a quantum causal model, in the sense that it would not be possible to make subsequent inferences about interventions (though it remains possible to perform further un-measurements). This could perhaps be regarded more as a limitation in the predictive power of quantum causal models, but it seems unsatisfactory given that classical causal models have no problems in computing combinations of interventions and un-measurements.
It is easy to show that any DAG can be converted into a QDAG without changing the causal pathways, simply by adding extra nodes to pre-existing causal pathways (for example by placing them in the middle of causal arrows such that the result is a node with one parent and one child). Thus if the DAG resulting from un-performing a SIC-measurement is not itself a QDAG, it could perhaps be converted into one by such a procedure. The problem with this solution is that the physical motivation for such a procedure remains unclear. There are many ways to convert a DAG into a QDAG, and this ambiguity would have to be accounted for on physical grounds. For the time being, therefore, it is left as an open question whether the procedure of un-performing a measurement can be modified in a natural and unambiguous way so as to preserve the QDAG structure.
Summary of Bayesian quantum causal models
The line of argumentation in this section has led to the following definition of a quantum causal model (in the conventionalist spirit):
Quantum Causal Model: A quantum causal model consists of a pair {P (X), G(X)} where P (X) is the reference behaviour of a quantum system (where the X are the outcomes of SIC-measurements) and G(X) is a QDAG such that P (X) satisfies the QMC with respect to G(X). The model provides rules for computing the result of two counterfactual behaviours: unperforming a SIC-measurement Z ∈ X or introducing an intervention Y on a SIC-measurement W ∈ X. The rule for un-performing a measurement is given by Eq. (23) and the resulting DAG is obtained by connecting the parents of Z to its children and then deleting Z and its attached arrows. The rule for introducing an intervention Y on W is given by Eq. (28), and the new DAG is obtained by deleting incoming arrows to W and introducing Y as its sole parent.
This definition has the following properties. Repeated un-measurements do not preserve the QDAG structure and so it is not in general possible to use the resulting model to make further inferences about interventions. Repeated interventions do preserve the QDAG structure and so the resulting model can be used to make further inferences about both interventions and un-measurements. Key differences to the classical case are the fact that the canonical measurements are all disturbing measurements, and the fact that the QMC is symmetric under causal inversion, whereas the classical MC is not. This is the result of two key differences: the fact that quantum systems no longer satisfy the quantitative Reichenbach principle RP1, and the fact that they do satisfy the qualitative Reichenbach principle RP2 and also its causal inverse, resulting in a symmetric version of the principle, SRP.
IV. DISCUSSION
Now that the technical foundation for a quantum causal model has been laid, it is time to step back and consider what has and has not been achieved. Taking a conventionalist view, causal structure is defined at the probabilistic level, and causal laws are rules that relate the probabilities between counterfactual situations. To date, quantum causal models have either been operational (correlations are not constrained by causal principles) or else realist, like Ref. [13] , where causal principles refer to abstract quantum processes and not directly to probabilities. The present work has shown that, beyond these approaches, a quantum causal model in the conventionalist spirit is also possible. Like other models, it rejects the quantitative part of Reichenbach's Principle RP1 and maintains only the weaker part RP2. However, without RP1 the question arises as to the origin of the bounds on quantum correlations. If these are not to be derived from the structure of quantum processes (as would be the refuge of the causal realist) then where do they come from? This is taken up in the following section, Sec. IV A, and amounts to merely making reference to certain results that have already been derived by the Quantum Bayesians on this matter.
Apart from showing this possibility, three unexpected side-effects have arisen from the insistence on a conventionalist view of causality.
The first is that SIC-measurements are the quantum counterpart to the classical measurements represented by the intermediate nodes in a causal graph. Unlike these classical counterparts, however, SIC-measurements are disturbing. This seems to be in conflict with another comparison of quantum and classical causal models, namely Ref. [28] , in which the quantum counterparts of the intermediate nodes in a classical model were supposed to be "passive", by virtue of being informationally symmetric. Upon further examination in Sec. IV D, it is found that there is no fundamental conflict between these two approaches. The present work merely emphasizes that it is not passivity that is the relevant property of such measurements (insofar as they can be called 'passive' at all) but rather their informational completeness.
The second side-effect is that the model turns out to be symmetric under causal inversion, a feature which appears quite naturally here, but would not make much sense to a causal realist, for whom a preferred direction of cause and effect is supposed to be built-in to the system prior to any observation. On one hand, according to a recent work (Ref. [29] ), the causal symmetry of the model would seem to imply that it represents 'eternal noise' and is therefore trivial. This is misleading -in Sec. IV B it is explained how 'eternal noise' can have non-trivial structure. Once it is accepted that causal symmetry does not make the model trivial, Sec. IV C explains its physical meaning.
The third side-effect is the necessity of extra structure that is not present in classical models. This extra structure has two facets: (i) the fact that correlations between a cause and one of its effects gradually diminish as more and more intermediate causes are interposed between them (a consequence of these being SIC-measurements) and (ii) the restriction of the causal graphs to QDAGs. The question of whether this extra structure could have a physical significance is discussed in Sec. IV E.
A. What are the causal bounds on quantum correlations?
Part of the motivation for the model presented here is that, by virtue of incorporating the Born rule as a causal principle, it has the potential to provide a causal basis for the particular bounds on quantum correlations. As things currently stand, however, the Urgleichung (which has been interpreted here as the causal principle that tells us how to un-perform measurements, cf Sec. III F 2) is not sufficient to completely single out the set of quantum probabilities. This is currently an active topic of research [30] .
To see how such a program proceeds, let P (X) be the probabilities obtained by performing the SIC-POVM X on some d-dimensional quantum system prepared in a fixed state. Now consider what one would expect if a different SIC-POVM Y had been performed instead of X. The Urgleichung (Eq. (18)) can be easily adapted to obtain constraints on P (Y ). First, imagine that Y is performed on the system after performing X. The probabilities P (Y |X) can be assumed to be given as part of the definition of the measurement Y . One can then use the Urgleichung to compute P (Y |X − ), which is simply the probabilities that would have obtained if X were not performed, i.e. if the measurement Y had been the only measurement performed on the system. It is then clear that, relative to the given P (X), not every possible distribution P (Y ) in the simplex of distributions over d 2 values will satisfy the relation to P (X) required by the Urgleichung: distributions outside this set represent probabilities that are not obtainable by performing a SIC-measurement on a quantum state of dimension d. In this manner, the Urgleichung defines a subset of probabilities called a qplex which are candidates for being obtainable from quantum systems. From this, one can in principle infer bounds on the strength of quantum correlations.
In Ref. [30] it was shown that there are probabilities belonging to the qplex that are not obtainable from quantum systems. To obtain exactly the quantum set, it is necessary to make an additional assumption. Ref. [30] proves that if the symmetry group of the qplex is isomorphic to the projective unitary group in d dimensions, then the state space of quantum systems is recovered.
Admittedly, there are two things that are unsatisfying about this state of affairs. The first is that this latter principle does not appear to be of a causal character, since it does not refer directly to counterfactual probabilities, but rather to the symmetry group of an abstract probability space. A conventionalist would prefer to obtain the quantum set of probabilities using a principle stated purely in probabilistic terms. It also raises the question of what kind of physical theory would result from dropping the assumption of unitary symmetry. Could experiments be designed to test the predictions of such a theory against those of standard quantum mechanics?
The second unsatisfying feature of our model runs deeper: what is the motivation for the Urgleichung itself? I have argued that it is a principle with a 'causal character', but it may be only one of many such principles. Other choices could lead to various different generalized probabilistic theories. Moreover, these would still be theories based on a conventionalist 'causal law', that is, a rule connecting the probabilities expected in counterfactual experiments different to the quantum rule. What then singles out the quantum Urgleichung from such alternatives? These questions have already been posed by the QBists as open problems, and the present work only extends the relevance of these puzzles to the realm of causal models.
B. On the interesting features of "eternal noise"
In a recent publication titled "The time-reverse of any causal theory is eternal noise" [29] , the authors presented an argument that would seem, at first glance, to imply that the quantum causal models presented here are trivial in the sense that no interesting physics can occur in them. Essentially, this is because all inputs to the model (if one thinks of the representation as a quantum circuit) are the maximally mixed state, and all processes (unitaries and SIC-measurements) preserve the maximally mixed state, so that one apparently has nothing more interesting than an initial state of pure noise evolving into a final state of pure noise -hence "eternal noise". Hopefully the results of preceding sections have convinced the reader that the model is not trivial, but it remains somewhat mysterious just how something non-trivial could arise from eternal noise.
The solution offered in Ref. [29] is that the meaningful content of physics lies not in the state (which in this case is always noise) but in the structure of the physical processes themselves, which it is suggested may be conceived of as ontological entities. This viewpoint is closely aligned with that of the causal realist: causal structure is a property of processes operating within a system independently of observations performed on them. Clearly, this idea would not appeal to the causal conventionalist, who prefers to locate the meaningful content of physics in statements about how the system would appear under different conditions of observation, and thus in terms of probabilities.
Fortunately, the process theory framework contains within it a link between process and probability (as it should, if it is to have any relevance to observations) and this link can be used to give a conventionalist's account of how interesting physics can arise from 'eternal noise'.
First note that in a process theory, every process comes equipped with inputs and outputs, and several processes can be wired together by connecting the outputs of some to the inputs of others (respecting certain rules). As defined in the present work, a quantum causal model can be regarded as a family of processes whose inputs are all the maximally mixed state (of quantum systems) and whose outputs are the classical data representing the outcomes of all the SIC-measurements. Members of this family all share the feature that the wirings between their sub-processes (which include only SIC-measurements or unitary maps) follow the causal structure of the model's QDAG. Different members of the family are distinguished only by different choices of the particular unitary processes of which they are composed.
In a process theory, processes without inputs are called states and those without outputs are called effects. Among these, there is a special state called the maxmially mixed state and a special effect called the discarding effect. Physically, the former represents the creation of a system whose state is completely unknown, while the latter represents the complete destruction of a system and all information about its state. A process is called terminal iff performing the process and discarding all of its outputs is the same as not performing the process at all. Similarly, a process will be called anti-terminal iff performing the process on the maximally mixed state of all its inputs is the same as not performing the process at all.
In the present work, a quantum causal model is represented by a process that is simultaneously terminal and antiterminal, because it is constructed from sub-processes (unitaries and SIC-measurements) which have both properties; in the case of anti-terminality, this is a consequence of the processes being unbiased. (Incidentally, this is also the reason why it is symmetric under causal inversion). For each observed variable X i ∈ X the quantum causal model has an output wire corresponding to a classical system of dimension d 2 Xi . Like any process, it can be associated with a set of probabilities corresponding to different combinations of effects on these wires. If we restrict attention to the effects corresponding to the outcomes of the corresponding SIC-POVMs, then these associated probabilities are precisely the behaviour P (X), and they contain all of the interesting information about the process. Thus, it is not necessary to treat the process as an ontological construct -one could just as well take the probabilities P (X) as fundamental, and regard the process as being merely a convenient abstract representation of the correlations and independences that appear within this behaviour.
This, then, provides the answer to how 'eternal noise' can have interesting structure: the outcomes of measurements performed on eternal noise can still be correlated in interesting ways, and these correlations are represented by the causal structure.
C. Symmetry under causal inversion
The following result is apparent from inspection of the QMC (cf Sec. III D):
Causal inversion symmetry: Suppose that P (X) satisfies the QMC relative to a DAG G(X). Let G * (X) be the DAG obtained from G(X) by reversing the directions of all arrows. Then P (X) also satisfies the QMC relative to G * (X).
At first glance, this property of quantum causal models seems to be a weakness. After all, it implies that in a system for which the timing of the measurements X is unavailable for guidance, it is not possible to deduce the direction of causality just by examining the reference behaviour P (X). This would be justifiable only if both directions were equally plausible hypotheses -yet if we were to perform an intervention on the system, it is clear that only one of the two hypotheses would be confirmed, namely, the one in which the causal ordering corresponds to the actual time-ordering of the measurements.
But is this information "really there in the system"? It is important to clarify what is at stake here. The question is whether the direction of cause and effect is already fixed within the system prior to any interventions made upon it. If so, then there is a certain sense in which A is a cause of B in a system prior to any attempt to manipulate A or B, which is tantamount to taking a realist view of causality.
A conventionalist would say that the question of whether A is a cause of B or the other way around depends on how an external observer interacts with the system, say by performing an intervention upon it. The conventionalist will readily admit that if we as observers perform an intervention on the system and find that A causes B, it is not within our power to perform any kind of alternative intervention that will bring about B as the cause of A. However, the conventionalist would insist that the revealed causal relation need not be an intrinsic property of the system but may instead reflect a physical constraint on the way in which we are able to interact with the system as observers.
There may yet exist other observers, constrained by their physical make-up to interact with the system in a manner opposite to us. The analogous physical operation to what we call an 'intervention', when performed by them, would result in a different set of probabilities. Whereas we would find the correlation maintained only when we intervene upon A, they would find it maintained only when they intervene upon B. This is not a fact about the system, but rather a fact about how different classes of 'observers' interact with the system. The present work does not attempt to elaborate on what constitutes an 'observer' and hence can neither confirm nor deny the possibility of observers having the speculated properties just discussed. Since, however, this remains an open question, it is a significant feature of the present model that it explicitly allows for such exotic possibilities. To see how this comes about, recall the properties (i)-(v) of a an intervention on a quantum system (Sec. III F 3). Since (ii) and (ii)* are the causal inverses of each other, the asymmetry is introduced in the remaining properties (i),(iv),(v). These properties mainly capture the modification that has to be made to the causal graph -deleting the incoming arrows to W and replacing them with a single arrow from Y . Depending on whether one chooses G(X) or G * (X) to be the causal graph prior to intervention, a different set of arrows connected to W will be deleted and a different causal graph will result. The significant point to be made is that whether one should choose G(X) or G * (X) as the DAG prior to intervention is not a piece of information that exists a priori inside the system itself, but rather depends on what relation we have to the system as physical observers, that is, which graph accurately explains what we would see if we were to interact with the system. Fundamentally, however, causality is ambivalent about its orientation.
To elaborate on this idea, recall the comment in Sec. III F that if only Homer Simpson could be certain of his future satisfaction (and conversely, uncertain of what is currently in the fridge) he could cause beer to materialize in the fridge by getting up to fetch it. The reason this is implausible to us is simply because we know as a matter of experience that what is currently inside the fridge is knowable to us and what lies in our own future is in principle unknowable to us. Yet this is only a statement about where we (and Homer Simpson) stand as physical systems in relation to the universe. To reinforce this point, recall the remark in Sec. III F 3 about the physical distinction between NS and its causal inverse NS*. The difference rests on the fact that as a practical matter it is impossible for us to send information outside of our causal future and thereby violate NS, yet very easy for us to perform interventions that are biased and thereby violate NS*. This is a physical asymmetry, but it is not an asymmetry that exists within the system -it is rather an asymmetry in how we are able to physically interact with the system. A quantum causal model presents a bird's-eye view of a physical system that is agnostic about such matters. Ask whether A causes B and the causal model asks us in return: what information is in principle accessible to you, and what is not? What physical operations can you perform and what can you not perform? What definition of 'intervention' is most appropriate to your physical relationship to the system? These details must be supplied -as physicists would say, 'put in by hand as boundary conditions' -before the causal model can tell us whether A causes B or the other way around. Prior to introducing an observer, therefore, causality seems to be entirely ambivalent about its direction in this model.
It is interesting to note that other authors, following different lines of inquiry, have also reached similar conclusions. In Ref. [31] , it was argued that the distinction between 'states' and 'effects' in the formalism of quantum theory is entirely conventional, as it depends on how one defines 'physical operations'. The authors showed that by extending the notion of physical operations, quantum theory could be regarded as perfectly symmetric in time (hence also in causality). Similarly, in Ref. [32] , the authors found it necessary to postulate a 'causal reference frame' associated to an observer, which defines "an observer-dependent time according to which an observer describes the evolution of quantum systems". The unexpected convergence of these different works makes a strong case that the direction of causality in physics is indeed conventional and not absolute.
D. A quantum advantage for causal inference?
Consider two variables A, B that are correlated, and consider the following hypotheses: (H1) A, B share a common cause C, or (H2) A is a cause of B. A classic problem in causal inference is how to distinguish these hypotheses. For classical causal models, the set of marginal distributions in the case of (H1) are equivalent to those that arise in case (H2), therefore it is impossible to distinguish these hypotheses just from the marginal reference behaviour P (A, B) -one requires either the full distribution P (A, B, C) or the results of an intervention in order to resolve the issue.
In a paper titled Inferring causal structure: a quantum advantage (Ref. [28] ), it was shown that when A, B are measurements on quantum systems, the marginal behaviour P (X, Y ) is sufficient to distinguish the hypotheses (H1),(H2). Therefore, the authors argued, quantum systems provide an advantage for causal inference over classical systems. However, there is a subtle assumption lurking behind this apparently straightforward conclusion.
In the classical case, it is still possible to distinguish the hypotheses (H1),(H2) provided one is allowed to perform an intervention on the variable A. More generally, any disturbing measurement of A can be useful in distinguishing the two hypotheses, because one can check whether the disturbance or manipulation of A affects the probabilities of B, which would indicate the presence or absence of a direct cause from A to B. The supposed impossibility of the classical task therefore strongly depends on imposing the restriction that A is a non-disturbing measurement. In order to make a fair comparison, it seems that one should require A to be non-disturbing in the quantum case as well -but how can one establish that a quantum measurement is 'non-disturbing' ?
The authors of Ref. [28] propose that the salient feature of the measurement A in the classical case is not that it is non-disturbing (in the sense that we have defined the term) but that it represents a passive observation. According to the authors, this means that it is informationally symmetric (IS): the post-measurement state conditioned on the measurement outcome is the same as the pre-measurement state conditioned on the outcome. Thus, for the comparison to be fair for the purposes of causal inference, it is only necessary that A be informationally symmetric in the quantum case.
But what is it about informationally symmetry that justifies equating it with "passive observation"? The authors do not explain the connection between these concepts. Consider, for example, an electron initially in the maximally mixed state of spin, subjected to a spin measurement of the Pauli σ Z observable, and the outcome indicates spin up, | ↑ . This satisfies the requirement of IS, since the state prior to measurement conditioned on this outcome is also | ↑ . However, if the electron were one member of a maximally entangled two-electron state, the σ Z measurement would destroy the entanglement and thereby disturb the joint state, a fact that can be detected by subsequent measurements on both particles. Given that IS measurements are disturbing in this operational sense, it is hard to see how they could be regarded as 'passive' -but if the measurement is not passive, then the comparison to the classical case is no longer a fair one, undermining the conclusions of Ref. [28] .
The present work offers a way out of this dilemma. According to the approach outlined here, the relevant feature of the measurement A in the classical scenario is not informational symmetry but informational completeness. In the classical case, the canonical informationally complete measurements happen to also be non-disturbing, and this justifies labelling them as 'passive', but such properties are incidental; it is a mistake to presume that it is the passivity of measurements that makes them relevant for causal inference. The key insight in the present work is that causal inference is not about avoiding disturbances on the system, but rather about being counterfactually informative.
Thus, what is important about A is that it can support causal relations as defined by the model, i.e. that it satisfy the relevant requirements to be a canonical measurement. Since canonical measurements are different in classical and quantum causal models, it should not trouble us that the quantum counterpart of A is a disturbing measurementindeed this can be understood as part of the explanation why quantum causal models provide an advantage to causal inference. Thus, the claim of Ref. [28] is vindicated by the present work, but for quite different reasons than the authors claimed. Quantum systems give an advantage to causal inference because the types of measurements that can sustain causal relations in quantum systems are necessarily disturbing, and disturbing measurements reveal more causal information than non-disturbing ones.
Remark: It is interesting to note that by virtue of being Lüders measurements, SIC-measurements are automatically IS measurements, too. It is also worth commenting that there is a certain sense in which SIC-measurements are locally non-disturbing, since (by virtue of being unbiased) their performance or non-performance on the maximally mixed state cannot be detected by measurements made on the same subsystem immediately before or afterwards. Thus, we may say that classical canonical measurements (except interventions) are non-disturbing in a 'global' sense and are therefore equivalent to passive observations, quantum canonical SIC-measurements are only locally non-disturbing, and so are only locally equivalent to passive observation. This enables them to be used (as Ref. [28] demonstrated) to identify causal structure through their disturbing effects on 'global' correlations in the system.
E. Emergence of space-time?
Causal structure has become especially interesting to physicists working on the problem of constructing a quantum theory of the gravitational field. General Relativity is based on an idealization of space-time as being defined on a continuous manifold of events. It is widely held that this idealization becomes untenable when the events themselves are quantum mechanical, as the extreme localization of a particle in a spatial region would introduce an uncontrollable perturbation in the metric due to the corresponding momentum uncertainty, rendering impossible the existence of arbitrarily well-localized test-particles [33] . Yet the smoothness of space-time is only an incidental feature of General Relativity, and appears not to be a necessary component of its defining principles. Rather, the primary role of spacetime in the theory is to define the causal structure between events, which raises the possibility that, at a fundamental level, space-time is nothing more than a (discrete) causal structure, from which the appearance of a smooth space-time manifold emerges naturally at sufficiently macroscopic scales.
A major obstacle to approaches to Quantum Gravity along these lines is that bare causal structure as represented in a DAG is not sufficient to provide anything approximating a picture of space-time geometry. It is an open problem to identify what additional assumptions and structure must be assumed in order to establish this correspondence. The present work offers some interesting new ideas about how this might occur.
The essential ingredient that is needed to connect a DAG to a space-time geometry is a way of quantifying the size of space-time intervals between events. A bare DAG can only tell us whether the interval is space-like or time-like, but cannot quantify it. One possibility is to associate a fundamental unit of geometry (length, area, volume) to each node in the DAG, whose accumulation along a causal path would give some notion of interval size. The present work comes equipped with a number at each node -the squared dimension of the local Hilbert space -allowing one to speculate that this might somehow be connected to the fundamental geometic unit, but such a connection remains to be established.
A more striking feature of the present work, and something that distinguishes it from classical causal models, is that it comes equipped with a natural metric along causal pathways. A sequence of measurements performed upon a classical system, or performed upon a quantum system in the same basis, results in a sequence of random variables that are perfectly correlated. However, a sequence of informationally-complete measurements made upon a single quantum system is neccessarily not perfectly correlated, because each pure state in an informationally complete set necessarily has non-trivial overlaps with several other pure states in the set. For example, consider the simplest case in which the same SIC-measurement is performed N times on the same system. The probability of obtaining the same outcome N times in a row is 1 d N , i.e. the correlation decays gradually as the number of nodes N along a causal path increases, but never reaches zero. This seems to present a novel way of defining the size of time-like intervals.
Another interesting feature is the apparent necessary additional requirement (for the sake of defining interventions) that the DAG be a QDAG. A QDAG exhibits a geometric feature that is remarkable: its variables can be partitioned into 'slices', such that all remaining variables are definitely in the causal past or causal future of a given slice. This is highly reminiscent of the way that hyperbolic space-times can be foliated into a set of space-like hypersurfaces. Whether this structure of a QDAG allows any more rigorous connection to space-time, particularly as regards to the problem of defining the size of spatial intervals, remains an open question.
Remark: It is notable that the features mentioned above are not strictly consequences of quantum mechanics, but became necessary only under the conventional interpretation of causality advocated in this work. That is to say, a causal realist has many options at their disposal as to how to represent the causal structure of quantum mechanics, whereas the project of the causal conventionalist appears to be much more strongly constrained. This can be traced to what might well be the central mystery at the heart of causal modelling: the fact that there exists a special type of ideal experiment such that, merely from the observed statistics in the experiment, it is possible to deduce what would happen in a counterfactual experiment in which certain interventions were performed. By insisting that the same should remain true for quantum systems -a standpoint that is only necessitated by the conventionalistone is practically forced to accept certain restrictions on causal structure that may lend themselves to a space-time interpretation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Science is primarily concerned with the acquisition of knowledge about the world, but in order to achieve this role it must also be concerned with understanding the limitations on how such knowledge can be acquired. This comes about because of the charming quasi-circularity of scientific enquiry: first, one investigates nature using instruments whose workings are well-understood; then, having fixed the natural theory, one turns it inwards to the instruments themselves and uses it to build more accurate instruments, which can then be used to repeat the process, leading to an ever more accurate and intimate connection between ourselves and nature.
The 'reflective move' of turning our theories of the world onto ourselves is captured by the opening quotation of David Hume -the idea that insofar as science is able to make deductions about the world, it must also be a study of our place in the world, and the limitations of what is knowable to us. The conventionalist approach to causality argues that causality is not entirely independent of our own physical station and role as observers.
On a manipulationist interpretation of causality, one is concerned with the information available to an observer prior to performing 'manipulations' on the system, this information being represented in the form of probability distributions describing what would be observed under the various counterfactual conditions. From this point of view, the causal relata should be maximally informative about counterfactuals, hence informationally complete, and this leads naturally to the idea of SIC-measurements as the elementary causal relata in a quantum system. From the properties of SIC-measurements, one arrives at the conclusion that the conditions that causal structure places on correlations are strong enough to limit the strength of correlations to (at least close to) the quantum bounds. Moreover, the properties of SIC-measurements lead naturally to a quantum version of the Markov Condition, which turns out to be symmetric under causal inversion. The asymmetry of cause and effect is found to be introduced at the moment that an observer interacts with a system by performing an intervention on it. Thus, one is led to conclude that the direction of cause and effect in quantum mechanics is somehow dependent on the physics of the observing system. The precise nature of this dependence is an interesting topic for future research.
The present causal model indicates that causal structure might well be reconcilable with the time-symmetry (CPTinvariance) of the observer-independent laws of physics. It also suggests that a better understanding of causality (and perhaps thereby of space-time) could be gained by examining the physical properties of observers themselves. The present work certainly seems to hint that causality in physical systems is ultimately symmetric under the reversal of the direction of cause and effect. Perhaps the study of causality is after all nothing else than the study of our own blindness to the true symmetry of the laws of nature.
